PROCEEDINGS AT HEARING OF NOVEMBER 4, 2020

COMMISSIONER AUSTIN F. CULLEN

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1	November 4, 2020
2	(Via Videoconference)
3	(PROCEEDINGS COMMENCED AT 9:30 A.M.)
4	THE REGISTRAR: Good morning. The hearing is now
5	resumed, Mr. Commissioner.
б	THE COMMISSIONER: Thank you, Madam Registrar.
7	Yes, Mr. McGowan.
8	MR. McGOWAN: Good morning, Mr. Commissioner.
9	Ms. Latimer has conduct of this morning's
10	witness.
11	THE COMMISSIONER: Yes, thank you. Ms. Latimer.
12	MS. LATIMER: Good morning, Mr. Commissioner. Our
13	next witness is Daryl Tottenham, and I
14	understand the witness prefers to be sworn.
15	THE COMMISSIONER: Thank you.
16	DARYL TOTTENHAM, a
17	witness called for the
18	commission, sworn.
19	THE REGISTRAR: Please state your full name and spell
20	your first name and last name for the record.
21	THE WITNESS: Daryl Edward Tottenham, D-a-r-y-l
22	T-o-t-t-e-n-h-a-m.
23	THE REGISTRAR: Thank you.
24	MS. LATIMER: Thank you. Madam Registrar, I ask that
25	affidavit number 1 be shown to the witness,

Daryl Tottenham (for the commission) 2 Exam by Ms. Latimer 1 please. 2 MR. STEPHENS: Ms. Latimer, it's Mr. Stephens here. 3 We have a hard copy as well just so you know, if 4 that's satisfactory. MS. LATIMER: Thanks. That does assist. 5 EXAMINATION BY MS. LATIMER: б 7 0 I'll just ask you if you could identify 8 affidavit number 1. You understand this was an 9 affidavit you swore to give evidence in these 10 proceedings; is that correct? 11 А That is correct, yes. MS. LATIMER: Can I ask that this be marked the next 12 exhibit, please. 13 14 THE COMMISSIONER: Yes. That's 148, I think, Madam 15 Registrar. THE REGISTRAR: Yes, exhibit 148, Mr. Commissioner. 16 17 THE COMMISSIONER: Thank you. EXHIBIT 148: Affidavit #1 of Darryl Tottenham, 18 19 sworn on October 30, 2020 20 MS. LATIMER: I'd ask that affidavit 2 now be shown 21 to the witness, please. MR. STEPHENS: Ms. Latimer, we have volume 1, 22 23 including the body of affidavit 2, before 24 Mr. Tottenham. 25 MS. LATIMER: Thank you.

1 And you recognize this as your affidavit 2 that Q 2 you swore to give evidence in these proceedings; 3 correct? 4 Yes, I do. А MS. LATIMER: And I'd ask that that be marked the 5 next numbered exhibit, please. б 7 THE COMMISSIONER: Thank you. That will be 149. 8 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit 149. 9 EXHIBIT 149: Affidavit #2 of Daryl Tottenham, 10 sworn on October 30, 2020 11 MS. LATIMER: Mr. Tottenham, you joined the New Westminster 12 0 13 Police Department in 1984; correct? 14 Yes. Α 15 0 And you spent 14 years on patrol and then did plain clothes police work for the 16 17 New Westminster police department until 2011; 18 correct? 19 Α That is correct, yes. 20 In the course of that work you did subject Q 21 targeting, drug investigations, human sources and homicides; correct? 22 23 Α Yeah. We -- yes, that's correct. 24 In the course of your police work were you Q 25 involved in search and seizures?

1	A	Yes, I was.
2	Q	Did that include seizures of cash that were
3		proceeds of crime?
4	A	We had a number of files that were involving
5		cash and possibly proceeds of crime.
6	Q	And did that cash have any distinctive
7		characteristics to it?
8	A	In many cases it was bundled in small bills,
9		generally is what we encountered.
10	Q	And how was it bundled?
11	A	Generally by bill denomination or in amounts
12		like thousand or \$5,000 amounts.
13	Q	Was it often wrapped in elastic bands?
14	A	At times, yes.
15	Q	You joined the British Columbia Lottery
16		Corporation in 2011 as a casino investigator;
17		correct?
18	A	That's correct.
19	Q	And you were initially assigned to the Starlight
20		Casino in New Westminster; correct?
21	A	Yes.
22	Q	One of your responsibilities initially in that
23		role was to send Suspicious Transaction Reports
24		to various agencies, including FINTRAC, the
25		Integrated Proceeds of Crime Unit with the RCMP,

1		GPEB and police of jurisdiction, which was the
2		New Westminster Police force; correct?
3	A	That is correct.
4	Q	And that list of recipient agencies changed over
5		time; right?
б	A	Yes.
7	Q	And the current recipients are FINTRAC, GPEB and
8		JIGIT; correct?
9	A	Yeah. Sorry, say that again. The
10	Q	The current recipients include GPEB, FINTRAC and
11		JIGIT, the Joint Illegal Gaming
12	А	Yes.
13	Q	Yes. And can you describe, please, the level of
14		cash buy-ins that you were observing at the
15		Starlight in 2011.
16	A	Originally when I first started, probably in the
17		first year, I noted there was a number of what I
18		would call fairly large cash buy-ins in the area
19		of as probably 50,000, 100,000, up as high as
20		\$200,000 on a fairly regular basis. Not daily,
21		but regular.
22	Q	Two to three times a week, maybe?
23	A	Yeah, generally. Yes. On average.
24	Q	And those buy-ins, were they in small
25		denomination bills?

The majority of them were in \$20 bills 1 А Yeah. 2 packaged in wads of 10,000, is generally what we 3 saw. 4 Q Were they bundled using elastic bands? 5 In most instances, yes. А Did it look like drug money? 6 Q 7 Α Well, it certainly had the appearance, the way 8 it was bundled, as drug money, yes. 9 Q Okay. 10 It's a possibility. Α And can you describe in 2011, 2012, what was the 11 Q approach to determining whether those cash 12 13 buy-ins were suspicious? During the initial stages when we looked at 14 Α 15 that, we -- it was obviously suspicious to us. We tried to make a determination at times, if we 16 17 could, of where the cash was coming from, but we didn't have any investigative ability or powers 18 19 to conduct investigations in that regard, so a 20 lot of the times we were trying to accumulate as 21 much information as we could from what we could 22 see in our positions as investigators from kind 23 of an observe/report position.

24 Q At that time in 2011 and 2012, is it fair to say 25 your focus was on source of wealth rather than

	2	
1		source of cash?
2	А	Yes, absolutely. We looked at the player and
3		their source of wealth as opposed to more
4		directly the funds.
5	Q	And in terms of individual transactions, that
6		was sort of a judgment call as to whether
7		further inquiries were necessary?
8	А	Yes, that's correct.
9	Q	In 2011 and 2012 you understood that BCLC had
10		the ability to ban patrons in certain
11		circumstances; correct?
12	А	That is correct, yes.
13	Q	And one of those circumstances was the ban of a
14		patron pending further investigation into their
15		source of wealth; correct?
16	А	Yes, that was a possibility. Yes.
17	Q	But I don't understand that this was the
18		approach at the time, but was it also open to
19		you to impose a ban to inquire into source of
20		funds?
21	А	No. I would say that's not that was not
22		something that was regularly considered or done.
23	Q	It was not considered or done, but was it open
24		to you to do that, just as you were doing that
25		when you were inquiring into source of wealth?

1 А I would say it was not a practice that I observed, but I would say that there's probably 2 3 circumstances in which that may happen. 4 Okay. And you mentioned at paragraph 7 that in Q 5 your role as a casino investigator -- I'm referring to paragraph 7 of your affidavit 6 7 number 1 -- you say you attended monthly investigator meetings. Do you recall what were 8 9 the main topics of discussion at those meetings between 2011 and 2013? 10 11 Α In general the topics -- the main topics would be looking at the activities -- I will call them 12 the big five casinos, the large five casinos in 13 the Lower Mainland -- the activities of the 14 15 patrons in terms of the ones coming in, buying in with large cash transactions and certainly 16 17 with a focus on the amount of cash coming in, the amount of -- the size of the buy-ins, the 18 19 denominations of the buy-ins that we were seeing 20 and issues that surround kind of who is bringing 21 that cash in. That was clearly the main focus. We covered a lot of other topics, but that was 22 often the main driver. 23

Q In terms of who was bringing the cash in, whatwere your concerns at that time?

1	A	Well, we were trying to at that time do whatever
2		we could from our perspective to determine who
3		was making the arrangements to facilitate the
4		cash to these players that they were bringing
5		in the cash that was coming in, or if it was
6		being delivered to the casino. So that was
7		kind of our focus was trying to understand kind
8		of from a bigger picture where the cash was
9		coming from and who may be involved, if it's
10		somebody that is in our system that we have
11		information on.
12	Q	Were you concerned at that time that the cash
13		might be coming from underground banks?
14	A	I when I first started, from all my
15		conversations in the first year, year and a half
16		from other investigators that was, I think, a
17		common belief, that the majority of the cash was
18		probably, likely coming from underground
19		banking.
20	Q	Were you concerned about that the cash might
21		be coming from loan sharks?
22	A	That was one or our concerns, absolutely, that
23		it could be coming from loan sharks or could be
24		proceeds of crime.
25	Q	You were concerned that the money both at the

1		underground banks and coming from the loan
2		sharks might be proceeds of crime?
3	A	Yes. Again, it's very possible. It could be
4		we had no knowledge into that and we had no
5		evidence to support that. It was a lot of
б		that was based on theory at that time, but that
7		was obviously a possibility.
8	Q	You had some evidence to support that concern
9		being the way the money looked when it was
10		coming in; correct?
11	А	Yes, correct.
12	Q	And were you concerned at that time that casinos
13		might be being used to facilitate money
14		laundering or drug offences?
15	A	I was concerned at the time that it the money
16		was suspicious and may be proceeds of crime.
17		From a money laundering perspective within the
18		casino, that was not one of my focuses or
19		beliefs that it was coming from that, but it was
20		probably the external source was the concern.
21	Q	Okay. At paragraph 11 of your affidavit
22		number 1, you mention that when you joined in
23		2011, investigators were assigned review
24		functions to ensure reporting to FINTRAC and
25		GPEB was occurring as required. And can you

describe what that review function entailed. 1 2 MR. STEPHENS: Mr. Tottenham just wants to turn --Ms. Latimer, sorry, it's Mr. Stephens. 3 4 Mr. Tottenham wants to turn that paragraph up, if that's satisfactory. 5 MS. LATIMER: That's fine. 6 7 MR. STEPHENS: I think it's paragraph 11, 8 Mr. Tottenham, on page 3. Para 11 at page 3 of 9 the body of the affidavit. No, page 3. 10 Para 11. I believe, Ms. Latimer, you read the first 11 sentence of that paragraph; is that correct? 12 13 MS. LATIMER: Yeah. 14 Just my question is what did the review function 0 entail in a practical way? 15 Okay. Yeah, I just wanted to confirm we were 16 А 17 talking about that same form. So the reviews that we were doing at the time that we went back 18 and reviewed were in connection with the reports 19 20 that were being processed for verified win 21 cheques and cash deposit or redeposited back into accounts. 22 23 Q Were you reviewing the Section 86 Reports that 24 were being submitted? 25 We did not -- we did not review specifically the А

1 86 Reports. The 86 Reports were one page that 2 was sent directly to GPEB from the service provider, so it wasn't part of our file when we 3 4 saw the file. We could confirm through digging 5 into a file to confirm if an 86 copy was sent, but it wasn't an actual part of the file. 6 Okay. Were you reviewing the Suspicious 7 Q Transaction Reports that were being filed? 8 9 А Well, we were preparing those. I mean, when we 10 went through -- when we actually prepared our 11 reports, we did our investigation, completed the STR reports. So these reports that we're 12 referring to were ones that were done as a back 13 14 check basically to ensure that the service 15 provider was doing the work properly in assessing correct verified win cheques and 16 17 redepositing back and forth into PGF accounts. You were -- were you -- I'm just trying to 18 0 19 understand what it was you were reviewing. Were 20 you reviewing the information that was entered 21 into iTrak against surveillance video, or ... 22 Reviewing the information that is -- makes up А 23 the file, including the tracking sheet to 24 essentially confirm that if a player is -- based 25 on the formula cash out minus buy-in equals

verified win. So we wanted to make sure when
 someone was receiving a cheque for a verified
 win that it was in the right amount.

4 So in order to do that we would have to look 5 at their play, their activity, and confirm how much they started with, how much they finished 6 7 with, cashed out, and that they were only given a cheque for the right amount for the verified 8 9 win and that any funds redeposited back into a 10 PGF account were done properly because you can't 11 introduce new cash into a PGF account. So we had to ensure it was all sourced cash from that 12 13 same table play.

Okay. The last four lines of this same 14 Q 15 paragraph, paragraph 11, you say that: "... this was an attempt by BCLC to get 16 17 all investigators involved in AML activities to ensure they recognized key 18 19 patrons at their respective sites, 20 including VIP patrons who were the subject 21 of most of our reports and suspected cash 22 facilitators who were suspected to be 23 providing funds for some of those VIPs." 24 Do I understand from this that as a result of 25 this review function, you could recognize key

1 VIP patrons frequenting the Starlight; correct? 2 Α Yes. 3 Q Did you also recognize key VIP patrons who were 4 frequenting other sites? 5 That is correct, yes. Α And the same thing with cash facilitators? You 6 0 7 could recognize those who were operating at the 8 Starlight; correct? 9 Α Yes, that's correct. 10 And also those cash facilitators who were Q operating at other sites; correct? 11 12 Correct. Α You describe in your affidavit in a couple of 13 Q 14 places PGF accounts. And at paragraph 15 you mention that in its current form it was 15 introduced in April 2012; correct? 16 17 Yes. That's correct. Α But then at paragraph 98 you clarify that there 18 0 was a form of PGF account that was first 19 20 introduced by BCLC in 2009; correct? 21 Yes, that's correct. А 22 And I appreciate that was before your tenure 0 with BCLC, but I take it you reviewed some 23 24 documents in preparing this affidavit to assure 25 yourself of that information; correct?

1	А	Yes, I did.
2	Q	Did you understand that this initial form of PGF
3		account was piloted at a handful of Lower
4		Mainland casinos through 2010?
5	A	Yes. I wasn't aware which ones they are, but
6		yes, that was the roll-out originally of the
7		PGF program.
8	Q	You weren't aware that those casinos included
9		the River Rock, the Starlight, Grand Villa and
10		Edgewater?
11	A	I was not no, not specifically which ones.
12	Q	You say at paragraph 26 of your affidavit, which
13		is on page 6 and I'm starting two lines down,
14		you say that:
15		" Service Providers considered they had
16		invested a lot of money in their VIP rooms
17		and in wooing VIP patrons. In my
18		experience during my first few years at
19		BCLC, including through conversations with
20		Service Provider management, any actions
21		by BCLC which were perceived to interfere
22		with these efforts, such as by speaking
23		with VIP patrons or considering bans on
24		VIP patrons, appeared to cause a negative
25		reaction from Service Providers.

My assumption, based on conversations 1 2 with Service Provider staff and 3 management, is that this reaction was due, 4 at least in part, to concerns that patrons might become offended, resulting in 5 potential loss of revenue. My perception 6 7 was that Service Providers were very 8 competitive with each other." 9 And so given that you were at this time 10 stationed at the Starlight, are you here 11 referring specifically to the service provider operating the Starlight at this time? 12 That comment is directed -- in 2011 and '12 13 А No. I worked at the Starlight and had a lot of 14 15 interaction with the staff there and the management there, but I was also aware of other 16 17 incidents that were happening at other casinos, in particular at River Rock, so the application 18 19 of my observations was based on all of that 20 material in combination. So it's not specific 21 that it was only happening at Starlight. It was happening, I think, at a number of places. 22 23 Q It was happening at the Starlight and the River 24 Rock; is that correct?

25 A Yes.

Q	It would also
A	It [indiscernible] there.
Q	Was it also occurring at the Edgewater?
A	I would I didn't have a lot of feedback in my
	early years, knowledge of that or hearing of
	that being an issue at Edgewater.
Q	Okay. You say you spoke with service provider
	staff and management and this was the impression
	that was left. Do you recall who it was that
	you spoke to who gave you this impression?
A	No, I don't think I could give you specific
	names. That was 10 years ago. I know that
	the at one point the manager, Randy, was one
	of the people I normally dealt with, and we had
	some very healthy conversations, but clearly
	when things are happening out there that was, to
	me, an observation from the staff meetings that
	I attended or any conversations I had with his
	staff. That that was always a concern that they
	were looking at is what the other service
	providers are doing from a competitive
	standpoint.
	Yeah, it was made very clear on a number of
	A Q A Q

24 occasions that the information that they had25 they did not want to be shared at other service

1		providers as they are in fact the competition.
2	Q	You mentioned speaking with Randy. Was that a
3		manager at the Starlight in those early days?
4	A	Sorry, what was the name again?
5	Q	Randy is the name that I heard you say.
б	A	Yeah, Randy. Yeah. Yeah, that's correct. Only
7		because he was there for quite some time, so I
8		had a lot of dealings with him. And some of the
9		conversations was about a couple of the players,
10		one in particular, at Starlight at the time. It
11		was actually it impacted this topic that
12		we're talking about in terms of a competitor
13		that was trying to steal him away, basically,
14		and get him to come gamble at their
15		establishment, so there was a fair amount of
16		discussion on that.
17	Q	And which player was that?
18	A	Li Lin Sha.
19	Q	Okay. And the competitor that was trying to
20		steal him away, was that River Rock?
21	A	That would be River Rock, yes.
22	Q	And did you have similar conversations with
23		management at River Rock?
24	A	Not direct conversations with their managers,
25		no. But I had conversations with the

1 investigators that were assigned over there, so 2 through those conversations it was clear to me 3 that that was actually happening. I believe at 4 one time one of them took me up and introduced me into an area in the VIP room that they were 5 6 kind of building for Mr. Sha, to it was pretty 7 evident that something was happening. Okay. And you understood from BCLC management 8 Q 9 at this time that you were not to speak with VIP 10 patrons; is that correct? 11 Α That is my position, yes. I think that was made clear and that was what I observed and thought. 12 Can you describe to the Commissioner what led to 13 Q 14 that understanding. 15 А I think in combination from my training when I first started. I was trained by Don Merkel, who 16 17 was stationed at Starlight, and worked with him for guite a period of time there. And in 18 19 conversations with him, other investigators, my 20 bosses at the time, John Karlovcec and Gord 21 Friesen, I think it was made pretty clear in 22 those discussions that we were to not approach, 23 not have discussions with patrons or take a more 24 aggressive or proactive role in that regard. 25 That -- basically it was cemented home for

1		me in 2012 with the meeting that we attended
2		where three investigators were pulled out and
3		spoken to by the VP on that topic that I became
4		aware of after the fact. So I think it was
5		pretty clear to me that the direction that we
6		were to take was observe and report.
7	Q	Okay. And that meeting in 2012 that you've
8		described that's the one that you've described
9		in more detail in your affidavit beginning at
10		around paragraph 29; correct?
11	A	That is correct, yes.
12	Q	And that was the incident where Terry Towns is
13		said to have told those investigators not to
14		speak to the VIP patrons; correct?
15	A	That is correct, yes.
16	Q	And that meeting you were not present for
17		that meeting; correct?
18	A	I was not. I was at the investigators meeting,
19		and they were pulled out of that meeting to go
20		meet with the VP.
21	Q	And it was Mr. Lee, Mr. Alderson and Mr. Beeksma
22		who were pulled out of that investigators
23		meeting; correct?
24	А	Yes, that's correct.
25	Q	And they reported on what had occurred at that

investigators meeting or at a later
 investigators meeting?

I had a conversation with two of them after the 3 А 4 conclusion of our investigators meeting on that day, and that conversation was central focused 5 on what had occurred when they got pulled out by 6 7 Terry Towns and met with him on the topic. So I recall clearly the conversations that we had, 8 9 and we were standing outside of the front 10 entrance of BCLC in Vancouver at the time. Т 11 did not talk to Ross at the time. It was just the two of them were there. 12

And then there were subsequent discussions, 13 I think, between me and a number of other 14 people, investigators, over the course of the 15 16 next couple weeks on that topic. It became 17 very, very apparent to all the investigators the content of that meeting. But I clearly had a 18 19 conversation that they indicated that Terry 20 Towns was not happy about the actions that they 21 took on that date with that patron, pulled him 22 out and spoke to him on the gaming floor. 23 Q And you sought to verify that direction with 24 your superiors, Mr. Friesen and Karlovcec; 25 correct?

1 Yes, that was -- from my recollection that was А 2 the next meeting that we -- that investigators 3 meeting. They were basically monthly meetings 4 because obviously there was a lot of discussion 5 about this in the following weeks. And then 6 when we came back and met as a group, we wanted 7 to broach that subject again and have that discussion about what does this mean; like, we 8 just want to confirm, is this what we're 9 10 supposed to do? Because obviously nobody wants 11 to lose their job. So we had that discussion and we put it --12 13 at that point at that point we put it to John Karlovcec and Gord Friesen, is this what we 14 15 should be doing? And what direction did Mr. Friesen and 16 Q 17 Mr. Karlovcec give you at that time? They gave us a direction to say follow the 18 А 19 orders of Terry Towns, essentially. I think in 20 terms of -- they understood it was a 21 chain-of-command issue, and when Terry Towns 22 made a directive and gave a direction to us of

what we should do that we should follow it. So
they conferred that message: you should follow
what he wants done.

1 Q And what did you understand that Mr. Towns 2 wanted done?

3 А My understanding is that he wanted us to focus 4 solely on the observe and report aspect of our job. It wasn't our job to determine if -- where 5 the money came from, if it was criminal or a 6 cash-based business and people bringing in cash. 7 8 Our job is to observe and report, period, and we 9 shouldn't be interacting with the players and 10 pulling people off the floor or taking any other 11 actions that would upset them and subsequently upset the service provider. 12

We had a job and it was straightforward andthat's what we should be doing.

15 Q Did you follow that direction at that time?

16 A Well, I certainly followed it in terms of I 17 didn't pull any players or have interaction with 18 players and go down that road. Yes, I did.

19 Q And did you continue to follow that direction 20 the entire time that Mr. Towns remained in his 21 role as the VP?

22 A Yes.

Q And you understood the sensitivity around
questioning VIP patrons to be a concern about
interfering with revenue generation; correct?

1	А	Yes, from the service providers.
2	Q	And so at paragraph 55 of your affidavit you
3		say this is at page 12. You say:
4		"Despite BCLC's practice of not refusing
5		(or not directing refusal of) large cash
6		transactions where there was no proof of
7		criminality, I was never directed by
8		anyone at BCLC not to take any steps that
9		would interfere with revenue generation."
10		I take it, sir, based on what you've said
11		earlier that the statement might be incomplete,
12		or what you mean is no one ever said that to you
13		directly; is that correct?
14	А	Yes, no one ever said that directly. I was
15		never told personally at any point in time.
16	Q	But you do recall receiving direction in 2012
17		not to take any not to approach VIP patrons,
18		and you understood at that time that that
19		direction was given in part because of a concern
20		about interfering with revenue generation;
21		correct?
22	MR.	STEPHENS: Mr. Commissioner, I object. That was
23		not Mr. Tottenham's answer to the two questions
24		that were posed in relation to that, and I
25		object to the premise of that question, which is

Mr. Tottenham said the revenue generation
 concern came from service providers, and
 Ms. Latimer's question presupposes it came from
 BCLC.

MS. LATIMER: I didn't say it came from BCLC. 5 6 I'm asking if you were directed by someone at 0 7 BCLC -- in this instance I'm referring to a direction you say you received from Mr. Towns, 8 9 Mr. Friesen, Mr. Karlovcec -- to observe and 10 report and not to approach patrons and you 11 understood that direction was given in part because of a concern about revenue generation, 12 whether that was their concern or the service 13 14 provider's concern. Do you agree with that? MR. STEPHENS: Mr. Commissioner, I object to that 15 question. She's asked -- Ms. Latimer, 16 17 respectfully, is asking a question about a direction he got from Mr. Towns with reference 18 19 to something a service provider may have been

20 thinking. I don't think that's a fair question,21 with the greatest of respect.

22 THE COMMISSIONER: Well, just a minute. I think the 23 question is about Mr. Tottenham's understanding 24 of why it was Mr. Towns expressed that 25 restriction on investigators' activities, which

1 was confirmed by Mr. Friesen and Mr. Karlovcec. 2 So -- and I think that was answered in the 3 context of it being -- arising from a concern 4 about interfering with revenue generation. So 5 unless I've misunderstood the evidence, it seems 6 to me it's an appropriate line of inquiry to 7 pursue. MR. STEPHENS: Mr. Commissioner, my note from 8 9 Mr. Tottenham's answer on the revenue generation 10 question was that it was something that flowed 11 from conversations with service providers. That 12 was my note. I don't have a transcript in front 13 of me. THE COMMISSIONER: Well, I thought what -- well, I 14 think this has to be clarified, but I thought 15 what he said was that the concern emanated from 16 17 service providers but it was conveyed to him by his superiors. So maybe I misunderstood, but I 18 19 think you can clarify that, Ms. Latimer. 20 MS. LATIMER: 21 Mr. Tottenham, you understood that the Q 22 concern -- you understood that you were directed 23 by Mr. Towns, Mr. Friesen and Mr. Karlovcec to 24 observe and report and not to approach VIP 25 patrons; correct?

1 A That's correct, yes.

2 Q You understood that that direction was given in 3 part because of a sensitivity that questioning 4 VIP patrons might interfere with revenue 5 generation; correct?

I would say -- to answer that as concise as I 6 Α 7 can, I would say we were given that direction because it upset the service provider with us 8 9 pulling their patron off the floor and put them 10 at odds with the service provider. They clearly 11 obviously complained about this issue when it happened with Stone, Steve and Ross. 12 That was an issue that was raised and it came back to 13 14 BCLC, which prompted the meeting that Terry 15 Towns made that comment.

It was -- they were upset with the fact that 16 17 we had done that and it comprised their ability, their position with the client and they likely 18 19 could have lost the client. That's -- from my 20 perception that's what I'm talking about with 21 revenue losses. If -- their concern is that 22 they are -- it's a very important part of their 23 client base, and if we were upsetting the VIP 24 clients and they're losing business and going to 25 other casinos, that would cause them a lot of

1 angst. And that's what the concern was when 2 Terry Towns came back to us and said, don't talk 3 to the patrons. 4 It was -- and it goes back to, again, one of 5 my original points in my affidavit about upsetting -- things that we did, if they were б perceived at negative it would upset the service 7 8 providers, and we had to be careful in terms of 9 what we were doing with them and how we dealt 10 with the service providers on site. 11 Q The service providers didn't want you to 12 approach VIP patrons because they might lose 13 that customer; correct? 14 That's correct, yeah. Α 15 0 And that would interfere with their ability to 16 generate revenue; correct? 17 That's correct, yes. Α 18 And BCLC was responsive to that return -- or to 0 19 that concern because it asked you not to 20 approach VIP patrons; correct? 21 That's correct, yes. А 22 So BCLC was responsive to the service provider's 0 23 concerns about losing revenue, and that 24 constrained the actions that investigators were 25 permitted to take; correct?

1 That's correct, yes. Okay. Α When and how did you become aware of Paul Jin? 2 0 3 А In the first year that I started working at BCLC 4 as an investigator at Starlight I observed files 5 where his name came up. I observed that he was 6 actually a player at one point. He had some play; it wasn't a lot. But I saw him on a 7 couple of files. I saw him on other files in 8 9 other -- because we -- obviously we can see any 10 activity from other casinos as well. So we were 11 seeing cash transactions and files that included him as part of the file and a couple of them in 12 suspicious circumstances. So that was one of 13 14 the first times I actually ran the into his name and saw his name. 15 16 Q So you were aware that he was a player and you 17 are also aware that he was making cash deliveries to casinos; correct? 18 19 Α We -- yeah, we observed that over the course of 20 that -- 2011 and into 2012 we were seeing him 21 pop up on numerous files. So when we're looking at files as a whole, we're looking at all the 22

files from the previous night. We would see the files from the previous night.

transactions and cash buy-ins at all the sites and we were seeing some commonality in some of these reports and -- I was seeing them anyways, and others were.

5 That Paul Jin's name was -- he kept popping up on the radar where he would be either б involved in a suspicious transaction possibly or 7 a cash drop off, or he would be onsite with 8 9 suspicious activity in terms of cash passed. So 10 his name was coming up more often than not, which drew attention to him. And there were a 11 12 couple of other people in that same category, but he was one of them. 13

Q When he made these cash deliveries, you
understood this to be him working, not him
having social interactions; correct?

17 That's -- over time as we started watching his Α activities and trying to understand what he was 18 19 doing, that was obviously the implication. That 20 if he was not coming in to play, he was coming 21 in to deliver money, he was doing cash facilitation. He was bringing it in to drop it 22 23 off for somebody that wanted it.

Q You understood there were others working withhim or for him; correct?

1	A	Yep. And, again, through the same observation
2		of looking at files and looking at the common
3		denominators, we started to see the same some
4		of the same vehicles being used and then some of
5		the same people popping up that were tied back
6		to either his vehicle or him directly or known
7		associates of him, so that was again some
8		commonality there.
9	Q	Exhibit 3 of your affidavit. You have prepared
10		a file summary outlining files from 2012 for
11		Paul Jin; correct?
12	A	That's correct, yes.
13	Q	And in preparing that summary, what did you rely
14		on?
15	A	I relied on going back into iTrak, which is our
16		computer system where we store all our files,
17		searching out Paul Jin, his profile and then all
18		associated files. So the way it sets up, we can
19		look at any file that created where he is either
20		directly or indirectly involved and named in the
21		file, and then went through by one by one each
22		file to see what his involvement was and then
23		did a synopsis of that file in for the
24		report.
25	Q	Okay. In the first bullet point it says:

Daryl Tottenham (for the commission) 32 Exam by Ms. Latimer "File 2012-43848." 1 And is that number an incident number from 2 3 iTrak? 4 That's correct, yes. А 5 Here you note that Mr. Jin was barred for a year Q in September 2012; correct? б 7 Α Yes, that's correct. 8 And then in the second bullet point there's a Q 9 different iTrak file number at the beginning; 10 correct? 11 А Yes. 12 You note that on September 27th, 2012, two days Q after Mr. Jin's one-year barring, BCLC received 13 a request from IPOC who advised that Paul Jin 14 15 was under investigation for money laundering and proceeds of crime at that time; correct? 16 17 Correct. Α And here you say -- well, at paragraph 46 of 18 0 19 your affidavit you say: 20 "Based on the high volume of STR reports 21 being sent to IPOC, FINTRAC and GPEB in 22 the period of 2011 to 2013, I assumed that 23 those entities would be very interested in 24 what BCLC investigators were observing and 25 reporting regarding Jin and Tam and their

1 suspected associates. However, based on 2 the apparent lack of response to our 3 reporting on those patrons and activities, 4 they appeared to show no interest." You'll agree with me that that statement is 5 incomplete; correct? 6 7 Α Yes. There is the -- this file obviously is 8 from IPOC. I don't know what the context of the 9 request is, but clearly from what I see here 10 they've made an inquiry at that time on a file, that single file, the 43822 file. 11 Right. And so IPOC is at least showing and 12 Q interest and has advised BCLC it is in fact 13 14 investigating Mr. Jin, citing a BCLC report and 15 investigating him for money laundering and proceeds of crime; correct? 16 17 Yeah, I would say you could draw that conclusion А that they were doing something at that point. 18 19 Yes. 20 Well, it says they were -- they advised he was Q 21 under investigation for money laundering and 22 proceeds of crime; correct? 23 А Yep. 24 And BCLC was asked by IPOC for all previous Q 25 files on Mr. Jin; correct?

1 Α Yes. BCLC cites 2012-43822, and you understood that 2 0 3 to be a specific iTrak incident file number; 4 correct? 5 Α Yes. Did you receive or review this request from IPOC 6 0 7 personally? 8 No, I did not. Α Did you learn about this communication at the 9 Q 10 monthly investigator meetings or otherwise at this time? 11 I wouldn't be able to advise at the time. 12 А Ι couldn't recall back at that time in 2012, if 13 that was a subject that was brought up or not. 14 15 You don't recall hearing in 2012 that Mr. Jin 0 was under investigation for money laundering and 16 17 proceeds of crime? I'm saying it's possible it happened, but I 18 А 19 don't have a recollection that I can say 20 absolutely that that occurred, no. 21 Okay. But in any event --Q 22 Quite likely. Α It would have been recorded in iTrak; correct? 23 0 24 Yes. А 25 And if anyone had been looking into Mr. Jin in Q

1		iTrak, they would have seen that information;
2		correct?
3	A	Yes.
4	Q	And Mr. Hiller responded to that request by
5		providing information in respect of cash
6		transactions, buy-in values and disbursements;
7		right?
8	A	That's correct, yes.
9	Q	Did you understand at this time in or around
10		2012 that law enforcement believed Mr. Jin's
11		alleged money laundering was in some way
12		connected to his activities at the casinos?
13	A	Sorry, did I believe that they that was their
14		opinion?
15	Q	Yeah, did you understand that at the time?
16	A	Well, I had to knowledge of what they were
17		doing, other than obviously if there was a
18		request they made, they were doing something,
19		but I have no direct knowledge of an
20		investigation that they were doing at the time.
21	Q	Okay. If you could turn to exhibit 5, please.
22		And I'm looking at page 47, at the bottom.
23		You'll see this is an email from Jennifer
24		Gallaway to you and others at BCLC dated
25		February 20th, 2019; correct?

Daryl Tottenham (for the commission) 36 Exam by Ms. Latimer 1 Α Yes. 2 Is subject is "BCLC Reporting Criminal Activity 0 3 to GPEB"; correct? 4 А Yes. 5 And Ms. Gallaway says she's: Q "... assisting the Comms team to locate 6 7 records that validate/prove statements 8 that BCLC reported concerns regarding 9 criminal activity to GPEB beginning in 10 2012 and into 2014/2015, leading up to the height of STRs." 11 12 She says: "Emails, notes, etc. anything that can 13 14 demonstrate our ongoing reporting of 15 concerns to GPEB." Correct? 16 17 Yes. Α Just above that email is an email from Bal Bamra 18 0 19 of BCLC to you and to John Karlovcec asking if 20 you can: "... send the attached which shows who we 21 notified of all the activities around 22 23 JIN?" 24 Correct. 25 Α Yes.

1	Q	And I take it what she's referring to is the
2		spreadsheet that follows on page 49. Correct?
3	A	Yes, I would assume that is what she's referring
4		to.
5	Q	Okay. This you understood this spreadsheet
6		to be not all suspicious cash transactions in
7		this period but only those that had a nexus to
8		Paul Jin; correct?
9	A	That is correct, yes.
10	Q	Now, did you understand the information in this
11		spreadsheet to come from iTrak?
12	A	I would assume that that's where it was pulled
13		from. The format that I'm looking at is not
14		something that it was obviously put on a
15		spreadsheet, but everything looks like it is
16		has an iTrak associated file.
17	Q	Okay. And you'll see, if you look in the
18		left-hand column, the date 20th September 2012.
19		Do you see that?
20	A	September sorry, September
21	Q	20th of September 2012.
22	A	Yep.
23	Q	And that you'll see the same incident file
24		number that was cited by IPOC; correct? In the
25		next column.

- MR. STEPHENS: Ms. Latimer, I think Mr. Tottenham is 1 2 trying to cross reference that number. Can you just remind him just to --3 4 THE WITNESS: The number that we're referring to. MR. STEPHENS: Yeah. 5 MS. LATIMER: 6 7 0 Yes. The number that I'm referring to is found 8 at exhibit 3, page 41. MR. STEPHENS: Can you remind Mr. Tottenham what 9 10 number that is, Ms. Latimer. MS. LATIMER: 11 So it's in the second bullet and it's not the 12 0 first file number, but if you read down to the 13 fourth line, it says: 14 15 "Requested all files on Jin, citing 2012-43822." 16 17 Yes. Okay, I've got that. And it's shown on А the spreadsheet September 20th, 2012, and it's 18 referenced "buy-in for Xu." 19 20 Correct. And Xu was a VIP player at this time; Q 21 correct?
- A All I've got is Xu. Like, literally that's all I got the information on, so I couldn't say absolutely that that was. I'm making an assumption that he was a player at the time, but

1		that's all I have is Zu, Z-u [sic].
2	Q	In your review function that you were discussing
3		previously, you indicated you were familiar with
4		VIP patrons, not only at the Starlight Casino
5		but other casinos at the time; correct?
6	А	That's correct, yeah.
7	Q	But Xu doesn't ring a bell as a VIP patron to
8		you at this time?
9	А	Well, you're asking me to narrow down this to a
10		patron. Xu is a very, very common name and
11		there's a lot of Xu's in our iTrak. I know from
12		experience. It would be hard for me I don't
13		want to give evidence to say that he is in fact
14		a VIP patron if he isn't.
15		I would agree in principle that the majority
16		of the people that we were dealing with that
17		were connected were in that category, that's
18		what they were getting deliveries, cash
19		deliveries for, playing at a fairly high level.
20		But I can't on two letters of a name I can't
21		confirm that player.
22	Q	Do we understand from this table, if you look
23		after so there's the third column is the
24		synopsis and the next column says "GPEB" and it

25 says "Section 86." Do we understand that a

1		Section 86 Report was filed with GPEB about this
2		incident?
3	A	Yes, I would assume that's what they were
4		referring to, that they confirmed that an
5		86 Report was filed by the service provider.
б	Q	In the next column it says "notification law
7		enforcement." That indicates that that
8		information would have been passed on to the
9		RCMP; correct?
10	A	That's correct, yeah.
11	Q	There's one column that's redacted, and then the
12		column after that it says "indirect." And do we
13		understand from this table that what's indicated
14		here was that Mr. Jin was indirectly involved in
15		this incident?
16	А	Yes, I would say that's what their intention
17		was, whether he was directly or indirectly
18		involved.
19	Q	Okay. In light of the inquiry that was made by
20		police about this incident file number, were any
21		conditions placed on the patron Zu in 2012 that
22		you're aware of?
23	A	I can't speak to that because I don't know the
24		patron you're talking about. Without seeing the
25		file I can't say that he was placed on

conditions or banned. 1 Okay. If you go back to exhibit 3, please. 2 0 Page 41. In what follows after the second 3 4 bullet, you outline is a variety of incidents where Jin is said to have attended Lower 5 Mainland casinos, including the River Rock, 6 Starlight and Edgewater casinos in violation of 7 his one-year barring and his subsequent 8 9 five-year barring; correct? 10 А Yes. Given that it had been communicated to BCLC at 11 0 this time, Mr. Jin was under investigation for 12 money laundering and proceeds of crime as of 13 September 2012, when Mr. Jin was observed at 14 15 gaming sites were police notified? I would -- I can't speak to every file, but I 16 А 17 would say from normal practice if he showed up and it was a violation entry, i.e. he came up 18 19 and tried to walk in the casino and was turned 20 around and left because he wasn't allowed in, 21 that kind of report would not be forwarded to police. But certainly if he attended and there 22 23 was any kind of a suspicious activity or cash 24 delivery transaction involvement, that would be 25 part of the report, and that would have been

1 directed to police.

2	Q	In that second kind of circumstance where
3		there's suspicious cash delivery, would that
4		report be made contemporaneously to police or
5		after the fact?
б	A	It would be made after the fact. It would be as

7 a result of a file being created, investigated
8 by the investigator, and then a subsequent
9 report that may flow from that, an STR, and then
10 copies of that would then go to those police
11 agencies.

12 Q At this point in time even when an individual 13 was under investigation by police, there was no 14 policy in place for BCLC to give real time 15 notification to police if that individual was 16 undertaking suspicious activity at a casino; 17 correct?

No, there was not. No. Not unless it was 18 А 19 something very, very specific to a request. 20 If you go back to exhibit 5, please. And Q page 49. I take it do we understand this --21 22 from this table that on any occasion where the RCMP is listed in the notification column that 23 24 they were notified after the fact of these 25 incidents?

1 And I think if you -- if you look at it А Yeah. as what I've just stated, if you take the 2 violation issues where there's numerous files 3 4 that are -- where it says "JIN ban violation" and there's no reference to RCMP, it's because 5 those are the initial contact entries. Anywhere 6 7 where there is an "RCMP" on here, it corresponds with a "buy in for" player, with a name. Buy-in 8 9 for another player, multiple -- I mean, that's 10 the commonality.

11 So I would say in those instances it was quite likely that this is a result of activity 12 13 that he was involved with in some way, direct or 14 indirect, that resulted in a report that was 15 subsequently sent to the RCMP. That would be a reasonable practice, a consistent application. 16 Okay. So where the RCMP are not listed, they 17 Q were not notified; correct? 18

19 A Yes, I would say that's correct.

20 Q Okay. Turning back to exhibit 3, please. And 21 I'm at page 42. You indicate that about a month 22 after his one-year barring and after being --23 after BCLC was notified that he was under 24 investigation for money laundering and proceeds 25 of crime, on October 25th, 2012, Mr. Jin arrived

1		at the Starlight and handed a patron a Gou Shi a
2		large bag which was found to contain \$150,000 in
3		20s, 50s and \$100 bills; correct?
4	A	That's correct.
5	Q	Mr. Shi used that money to rebuy on the table;
6		correct?
7	A	That's correct, yes.
8	Q	And that was the incident that resulted in Jin
9		being barred for five years; correct?
10	A	That is correct.
11	Q	But that cash was not refused by Mr for
12		Mr. Shi; correct?
13	А	No, it was not.
14	Q	And why not?
15	А	At the time, this is again going back to this
16		is 2012 we didn't have any direction or
17		policy that would allow us to refuse cash at
18		BCLC.
19	Q	Even when the cash was received from an
20		individual who was under criminal investigation
21		for money laundering and proceeds of crime?
22	А	Well and, again, without going in and
23		reviewing each file, but I would say when I'm
24		looking at this file, anything that we do is
25		very rarely is it ever in real time, it's always

1 after the fact. So the majority of these files 2 that we're looking at and the majority of the 3 files we reviewed literally are -- and our 4 investigators review on a daily basis and report 5 on through STRs are based on reviews, video surveillance and then investigation and then a 6 formulation of a report, a confirmation of 7 suspicion and then an STR. 8 9 So we aren't in a position -- when the money

10 first comes in and Gou Shi gets \$150,000 11 delivered, if we're not seeing that -- or sorry, the site is not seeing that in real time, there 12 is no way that they could actually effect any 13 kind of action to refuse that cash. We don't 14 15 find out the source of that cash until we go back and do those reviews and that's what we 16 17 found the issue is in a number of these files 18 where it references why it wasn't stopped at the 19 time.

At the time it was Gou Shi came back in with \$150,000. So you would have to make an assumption that it's live monitored, and that whoever is live monitoring knows who delivered it, knows that person, has the ability to check that person's status on the system. So quite

1 often when somebody pulls up in a car and they 2 leave, they won't know who the car belongs to 3 unless it's somebody that's got a vehicle in the 4 They won't know who the driver is system. unless they're able to ID them. So a lot of 5 those, even if it's live monitored, it would 6 7 make it very, very difficult for them to come to a conclusion in that immediate moment. 8

9 So generally these buy-ins will happen very 10 quickly, and then after the fact we are able to 11 piece it back together and realize where the source of the cash is, which is what happened in 12 13 this instance, and they subsequently banned 14 Mr. Jin as a result of this and other activity. 15 0 When the review happened after the cash buy-in, 16 were conditions placed on Mr. Shi's play at that 17 time?

A At that time? Again, I would have to read the file to confirm, but I would suspect not because at that time we did not have processes in place to place sanctions or restrictions on players. That wasn't a common practice.

23 We're talking 2012 in this one here. We 24 didn't have that into play. We did have those 25 rules subsequently brought into play in latter

1 years, but at that time that was not a policy 2 that we had and a direction that we could take. I'm going to come back to Mr. Shi in a moment, 3 Q 4 but first you say in your affidavit at 5 paragraph 46 that in or around 2012 or 2013 you 6 also identified Kwok Chung Tam as potentially being at the centre of a cash facilitation 7 network; correct? 8 9 А Is that 44? 10 MR. STEPHENS: Pardon me, Ms. Latimer. I think 11 Mr. Tottenham's having trouble finding your 12 reference. Could you just repeat your paragraph 13 reference, please. 14 MS. LATIMER: Paragraph 46. THE COMMISSIONER: Isn't it paragraph 44? 15 16 MS. LATIMER: I apologize. 17 THE WITNESS: Paragraph 44 is the paragraph that's Kwok Tam. 18 19 MS. LATIMER: Yeah, paragraph 44. That's correct. 20 THE WITNESS: Okay. Sorry, could you just repeat the 21 question. I was just focused. MS. LATIMER: 22 You understood in or around 2012 or 2013 that 23 0 24 Kwok Chung Tam was also potentially at the centre of a cash facilitation network; correct? 25

1AYeah, it was my belief at the time, and that2was, again, based on my observations and common3denominators of files similar to what we did4with Jin.

- 5 Q And you eventually realized in part from 6 discussions with the RCMP that he was likely 7 Paul Jin's boss; correct?
- That was probably the clincher. We had 8 А Yes. 9 enough connections with Paul Jin's group that 10 we started -- I started to see some ties that tied him back to Paul Jin, but absolutely we 11 confirmed that with a corporal in the RCMP who 12 was aware of the hierarchy and informed me of 13 14 that.
- 15 Q So you were aware at this period of time that 16 these two individuals were of interest to law 17 enforcement; correct?

18 MR. STEPHENS: Sorry, Ms. Latimer. Could you 19 please -- just for fairness to the witness, what 20 period of time are you speaking about in that 21 question? Sorry, Mr. Commissioner. Just for 22 clarification.

23 MS. LATIMER: 2012, 2013.

24 MR. STEPHENS: And your question was what

25 Mr. Tottenham's knowledge in what regard,

1 please, Ms. Latimer? Just -- sorry for 2 interrupting. MS. LATIMER: In his affidavit at paragraph 44. 3 4 "In or about 2012 or 2013, I also Q 5 identified Kwok Chung Tam as potentially being at the center of a cash facilitation 6 7 network ..." And then near the end of that paragraph he says: 8 9 "I initially thought at that Tam and Jin 10 ran two separate networks, but ultimately 11 realized (in part from my discussions with 12 RCMP) that it was likely a single group and that Tam was believed to be Jin's 13 14 boss." 15 And my question was at this point in time, in 2012 and 2013, did you understand that Mr. Jin 16 17 and Mr. Tam were of interest to law enforcement? No, I don't think I could say that. What I was 18 А 19 saying in that paragraph is that through 20 associations with buy-ins, actions and 21 transactions related to what Mr. Paul Jin was 22 doing, initially I thought we had two competing 23 groups and then I started to see a lot of 24 crossover over the time. Eventually -- and I 25 think I state it in there in the paragraph of my

affidavit that eventually I came to the absolute
 conclusion that he was in fact believed to be
 Paul Jin's boss.

4 That was the statement that I got from -- or 5 the information I got from the corporal in the 6 RCMP. That wasn't until sometime later where we 7 actually got the confirmation of that. That was 8 a few years later.

9 In terms of what we were actually looking 10 at at the time, this was just based on my 11 observations kind of working up to, we think 12 there's another group; maybe there isn't; now there's a bunch of connections to Paul Jin. So 13 14 I couldn't say that he was under -- that Kwok 15 Tam was under police investigation at that time because at that time I -- in 2012 I had not 16 17 absolutely definitively connected him to Jin's organization. 18

19QSir, IPOC identified to BCLC in 2012 that Paul20Jin was under investigation for money laundering21and proceeds of crime. I took you to that.22Correct?

23 A Yes.

24QAnd at this point in time, you were in25communication with law enforcement; correct?

1	А	I'm in communication with what? I'm missing
2		something here.

Q Well, you state in this paragraph that you had
discussions with RCMP in or around 2012 and
2013; correct?

The discussions I had were not in 2012. They б А 7 verified that information. That's what I'm 8 trying to get across here. The information where I actually confirmed the hierarchy of --9 10 where Kwok Tam was in the grand scheme of things 11 was much later from a corporal in the RCMP. Up until that point it was my belief that his 12 involvement was initially on his own, and then 13 14 as we got more information and more intelligence 15 and started connecting the dots that he was more likely working with Jin's group but with 16 17 selective people.

In 2012 and 2013 when you were looking into Kwok 18 0 19 Chung Tam and Paul Jin on your own, did you 20 discuss that with other investigators at BCLC? 21 We had other -- at our meetings we had Α Yes. 22 discussions about all the files that were going on an ongoing basis, and the name Kwok Tam did 23 24 come up, I'm sure, on a number of occasions that 25 we had those conversations because he was

1

25

showing up on some files.

2	Q	You agree that it would be a serious failure to
3		pass on important information if it was not
4		communicated to you that one of your fellow
5		investigators had learned from the RCMP that
6		Paul Jin was under investigation for money
7		laundering and proceeds of crime at that time?
8	А	You're suggesting that it would be a failure of
9		an investigator to not report that and not share
10		it?
11	Q	Yes.
12	А	I would say that would yeah, that would not
13		be a good thing if they weren't sharing
14		information. I don't believe this to be the
15		case, but I don't think that would be obviously
16		a good thing for an investigation. And
17		certainly from the investigators' point of view
18		at BCLC we what we do is share the
19		information literally on sometimes on a daily
20		basis about files that were going on, but
21		certainly weekly basis and monthly with our
22		meetings, and that was a normal practice.
23	Q	And more than likely if you were looking into
24		Paul Jin and it had been recorded in iTrak that

that communication had been made from the RCMP,

1		more than likely you would have been aware of
2		that; correct?
3	А	I would I probably was made aware of it at
4		the time. That's very possible. I don't I
5		can't say a hundred percent. I don't recall
б		that happening, but yes, it's very possible.
7	Q	Now, in 2013 Mr. Desmarais took over for
8		Mr. Towns as Vice President of Corporate
9		Security and Compliance; correct?
10	A	Correct.
11	Q	And Michael Graydon was eventually replaced by
12		Jim Lightbody as president and CEO of BCLC?
13	A	Correct. At the end of 2013.
14	Q	And at paragraph 74 of your affidavit you
15		identify these as pivotal moments in the AML
16		approach at BCLC, correct?
17	A	That's correct.
18	Q	In October 2013 the BC Lotto Corporation AML
19		Unit was created, and you were promoted to AML
20		specialist; correct?
21	A	That is correct.
22	Q	Could you describe what that role entailed,
23		please.
24	A	Essentially they were creating a new unit, which
25		is the AML Unit. It was headed by John

1 Karlovcec, so he was put into the manager's role 2 of the AML Unit. And then my position was that 3 of an AML specialist, which is basically to 4 assist him with the creation of the unit and the 5 roll out of the unit.

So my job function was essentially to report 6 to John, and then we started from ground up. We 7 built the AML Unit by manual, by processes and 8 9 worked our way out and obviously collecting 10 information from investigators and anything that 11 we could come up with to focus on AML-related information and investigations, and that was our 12 initial first year, and AML training. 13

14QIf you turn back to exhibit 5, please. And I'm15looking at page 50. I had earlier been asking16you about a player called Mr. Shi, and you'll17agree with me there were further incidents where18Mr. Jin was indirectly involved in buy-ins for19Mr. Shi in 2013; correct?

20 A Yes, it would appear so.

21 Q And that includes on September 10th, 2013;22 correct?

A Yes.

24 Q And also November 5th, 2013; correct?

25 A Yes, that's correct.

1	Q	And December 8th, 2013; correct?
2	А	That is correct, yep.
3	Q	And no conditions were placed on Mr. Shi in
4		2013; is that correct?
5	A	That is correct.
6	Q	And over the page on page 51 there were further
7		incidents where Mr. Jin was indirectly involved
8		in buy-ins for Mr. Shi in 2014; correct? I'm
9		looking at May 23rd, 2014.
10	А	Yes, I see that one.
11	Q	Okay. If you turn to exhibit 38, please. And
12		I'm looking at page 369, which you'll recognize
13		as if you look in the middle, it's an email
14		from you to Trevor Emmerson of CFSEU dated
15		December 2nd, 2014. Do you see that?
16	A	Yes.
17	Q	The subject line is "Paul JIN"; correct?
18	A	Үер. Үер.
19	Q	Ask you say you attach a spreadsheet that Jerome
20		did for Jin over the past six months. And who
21		is Jerome?
22	А	Jerome Wakeland was an investigators for BCLC.
23		I think he was with us for about a year
24		stationed out at River Rock. And then left to
25		the Securities Commission.

1	Q	And if you turn to page 371, this is the table
2		that is referred to in that email; is that
3		correct?
4	A	Yes.
5	Q	And this table is entitled "All Incidents With
б		Suspected Involvement of Paul Jin"; correct?
7	А	That's correct, yep.
8	Q	If you look in I'm looking at the third
9		column of this table where the date is set out.
10		If you look at the date for the 23rd of May
11		2014, this entry provides a bit more information
12		about the May 23rd buy-in for Mr. Shi; correct?
13	A	What's the date that you've got on that
14		document, please?
15	Q	I'm at page 371 of the affidavit in the
16		exhibits.
17	A	Okay.
18	Q	I'm looking at the entry in this table for the
19		23rd of May
20	A	May 23rd, okay, for "Guo Tai Shi." Yep.
21	Q	Okay. This is just providing a bit more
22		information about that transaction; correct?
23	A	Yes. Correct.
24	Q	It occurred at the River Rock; correct?
25	A	Yes, that's correct.

1	Q	And it sets out the amount 246,605; correct?
2	A	That is correct.
3	Q	And in the middle column what's noted is a
4		particular vehicle that was involved in the cash
5		delivery, and that was a white Toyota Sienna;
6		correct?
7	A	That is correct, yeah.
8	Q	And we understand that from the fact that
9		there is an X in the "vehicle suspected" column
10		that this vehicle was suspected to be associated
11		to Mr. Jin? Correct?
12	А	That is correct, yes.
13	Q	At this time did investigators understand that
14		the same vehicles were making the cash
15		deliveries on behalf of Mr. Jin but sometimes
16		with different drivers?
17	A	Yeah, that was widely known. And that was a lot
18		of the information that we were trying to track
19		and collate and put together, which vehicles
20		were being used and who was driving the vehicle
21		at the time.
22	Q	Okay. In the column that's to the furthest on
23		the right, it's called "aftermath" and it
24		says it's noted that the vehicle lessee was
25		Chadwick Bellwood?

1	A	Correct. Yeah.
2	Q	Did you understand at this time that
3		Mr. Bellwood was an associate of Mr. Jin's?
4	А	We believed him to be associated to Mr. Jin,
5		yes, as what we'd refer to as a runner and
6		probably bodyguard type activities. That's what
7		we believed at the time with him.
8	Q	He was you believed he was working for
9		Mr. Jin?
10	А	Yes.
11	Q	And you say you thought he was a bodyguard. Did
12		you think that there was a risk of violence
13		around Mr. Jin?
14	А	No. It was just from his background, a very big
15		guy and some of his training that he was into
16		led us to believe that and he was the seen
17		often with just accompanying him, so it
18		appeared that that was the case, but we had no
19		information to confirm that.
20	Q	Was Mr
21	А	But he clearly was delivering at times
22		delivering cash using his vehicle.
23	Q	Okay. Was Mr. Bellwood also subject to a
24		province-wide barring at this time, May 2014?
25	A	I'm not able to confirm that without looking

1 into a file for him, but he would likely be somebody that we would have banned. I would say 2 3 it's highly likely he was banned. He would be one of our targets that we would be banning. 4 Okay. In paragraph 39 of your affidavit, which 5 Q is at page 9. 6 7 Α All right. You set out there that it wasn't until 2014 that 8 Q 9 the AML Unit began compiling a list of patrons 10 known to be receiving cash deliveries from 11 Mr. Jin, his known associates or persons driving his car; is that correct? 12 I mean, when I put this in it started in 13 А Yeah. 2014 and on behalf of the AML Unit, that was 14 kind of -- more of our really central focus. 15 That same kind of work was being done prior to 16 17 2014. Like, I was doing some of this work and as were some of the other investigators where we 18 19 were trying to compile information specific to 20 Jin, his vehicles, known associates and then 21 other vehicles that were tied in to those known associates. So we're just, again, trying to 22 23 acquire all that information and pull it 24 together. 25 But in -- obviously in the AML -- from the

1 AML perspective that became one of our central 2 core focuses when we opened the unit due to his activities because we were in discussions from 3 4 the very early days trying to get assistance, police assistance in getting an action on 5 6 Mr. Jin's group. So ... 7 Q Is it your evidence today, then, that you started to compile a list of patrons known to be 8 9 receiving cash deliveries from Jin, his known 10 associates or a person driving his vehicle before 2014? 11 12 Well, I would say we -- I started, as I stated А 13 earlier in my affidavit, in 2011, '12, '13, I 14 was looking at this information quite closely and trying to bring it together and identify 15 associates and vehicles and people related to 16 17 Jin. So that was a continuing process. There wasn't any definitive start/stop point. 18 19 When the AML Unit started up, and besides 20 myself and John as the manager, we had two 21 analysts. We were then central focused in terms 22 of okay, let's go at Paul Jin and that becomes, 23 like, the first project that we're going to 24 target. So starting in there we started to do a 25 lot more work in trying to get direct links and

ties to Jin with the intention of building this 1 2 information as a package that we could present 3 to police along with the other material they 4 were already getting to try and convince them to come assist us in taking an enforcement action 5 6 against Jin's group because up until that point we had absolutely nothing that I could see in 7 response from police that we were taking an 8 9 action on him. So that was our point. 10 Okay. I'm interested to know when you started Q 11 to compile a list of patrons known to be receiving cash from him and his associates as 12 opposed to a list of his associates. When did 13 14 the focus turn to patrons in particular? Well, I think that was -- I don't know that I 15 А could split hairs and say patrons versus 16 17 associates. When we were collecting information in the early days and when I was looking at it 18 19 in 2011, 2012, the value of the information I'm 20 looking at included patrons. It wasn't specific 21 to, but if I saw he was consistently delivering 22 to three separate patrons all the time, every 23 time they came in he was involved in that, that 24 would be important information for me because if 25 I am able to engage police assistance or pass

information to police, it gives them a viable
 target for surveillance purposes where they
 would start.

4 So it's not something that we'd just, like, 5 flip the switch and start looking at patrons as well. But in terms of the profile, when we were 6 7 trying to take actions on Mr. -- on Paul Jin, at one point part of our process, part of our 8 9 theory was when we started seeing other people 10 showing up with his vehicle making deliveries, we believe are making deliveries on behalf of 11 him, that we should ban those people and that 12 might help. And we quickly found that didn't 13 14 help because they were just replaced and they 15 weren't coming into the casinos. So we had to find another kind of tactic to use. So --16 17 You'll agree with me that you didn't -- BCLC did Q not place conditions on players until 2015 for 18 association with Paul Jin; is that correct? 19 20 That's correct, yep. Α

21 Q So even though you had been looking at them 22 dating back to 2011, 2012, no action was taken 23 to curtail their association with Paul Jin; is 24 that correct?

25 A No direct actions were taken in terms of a

1 sanction against the patrons in most cases, no. 2 0 Why not? 3 А Again, it wasn't -- we didn't have a policy in 4 place that an allowed us to take enforcement 5 action like that at the time. We were suspicious of the cash. We weren't -- we didn't 6 know that there was criminality associated to 7 the cash, but we were suspicious of it. We 8 9 didn't know where Paul Jin was getting his funds 10 We believed it was underground banking, from. but we didn't know that for a fact. So it would 11 be difficult for us to take an enforcement 12 13 action on the players.

14 The majority of the players we were dealing 15 with were very wealthy businessmen that we had sourced out their income. We knew they were 16 17 wealthy; they knew we had no adverse media, criminal records, backgrounds, associations. It 18 19 was where they were getting their cash from that 20 was the concern. So we had a bit of an issue in 21 terms of how we could take an approach and ban 22 those people or take an action against those 23 people as the players without some kind of 24 evidence, evidence-based criteria that says this 25 is proceeds of crime that you're getting.

1 It's suspicious where they're getting their money, and we don't even know in every instance 2 3 where they were getting their money, if it was 4 from Paul Jin and other sources, but we didn't 5 have the evidence to suggest it was anything more than that at that point in time. And we 6 have to be able to defend our actions that we 7 take against players, and that was not a common 8 9 policy that allowed us to do that at that time. 10 What level of proof was required at that time Q 11 when you did know that Mr. Jin was under investigation for money laundering and proceeds 12 13 of crime by the police? Well, again, I'm -- if you -- if you look at it 14 А from the way that you've phrased it -- and 15 16 sorry, I can't answer this question easily --17 you phrased it as as a result of a request that went to another investigator saying he's under 18 19 investigation and they're collecting 20 information. It doesn't tell me long-term that 21 they've got an active investigation going, they're doing anything, and I saw everything 22 23 that pointed to the contrary that anything was 24 happening.

25 So although they may have served the notice,

1 we've gotten notice like this on a lot of 2 players from the RCMP and from different groups and JIGIT, it doesn't necessarily mean tat 3 4 they're doing a long, extensive investigation, 5 and we saw no evidence that suggested anybody was targeting or working on him at the time. 6 7 So you're trying to get me to tie his 8 activities moving forward into 2014 and then '15 9 based on he's under investigation from a file 10 request in 2012. I have no knowledge and no way 11 to confirm and never heard any information back from the RCMP confirming they had any kind of 12 active investigation on him, so I don't think I 13 14 can phrase it the way that you've put the

15 question.

16 Q You met with the Combined Forces Special 17 Enforcement Unit in or around April 2014; 18 correct?

19 A That's correct.

20 Q And what was the purpose of that meeting? 21 A The purpose of that was kind of following what 22 we were just talking about. We were getting no 23 response from law enforcement. We had an 24 observe and report capacity, that was our 25 mandate, which we did. We were spending

1 information out to multiple agencies, including 2 Proceeds of Crime and FINTRAC and GPEB and law 3 enforcement, but we were not getting any 4 activity in terms of enforcement, and 5 enforcement directed at the people that are --6 we've identified as primary targets and subjects 7 are coming in and conducting their business on the casino properties with casino patrons. 8

9 So our initial contact with CFSEU was we 10 identified them as a very logical group, police 11 agency, that may be able to provide assistance 12 to target Jin's group. So it was based on a 13 large province-wide organization, RCMP. They've 14 got tactical, they've got surveillance 15 abilities, investigative and project driven.

So that fit all the criteria that I thought 16 17 we were looking for, so that was kind of our first port of call was to CFSEU to try and 18 19 engage them to come help us, to come investigate 20 and deal with this because we were at a loss to 21 deal with it -- effectively deal with it. And 22 as you can see, over those years the numbers 23 were rising constantly. We weren't able to 24 control it without enforcement.

25 Q On May 6th, 2014, did you meet again with CFSEU

1 to look at targeting? 2 I met on several occasions through 2014 because А 3 we originally met with them to pitch the 4 project. Then I met with them shortly 5 thereafter to give them a small version of a breakdown of some information for target 6 information, and then we had -- I had 7 conversations. We had intelligence back and 8 9 forth in June, July. Given more information for 10 a potential project, if they were able to take it on and do it. So it was more of that 11 12 prompting, here we are; here's more information, 13 keep padding it.

14 We didn't hear anything back from that 15 point. I went back and made a phone call again 16 in August and again it was kind of a 17 rattle-the-chain moment just trying to get some ideas if they were actually going to engage and 18 19 do a project. I was informed at that time that 20 they were tied up with other projects; they 21 couldn't.

Then we went back in October. And then I went back in November for another meeting in Surrey and with the same thing, that we hadn't heard from them, what was their status and

1 trying to engage them to start a project on 2 Mr. Jin's group. You've described information that you were 3 Q 4 providing to CFSEU, and I'll suggest to you they 5 were also providing information to you. Is that б correct? 7 Α That's correct, yep. 8 You received a provincial tactical enforcement Q priority [indiscernible] of individuals deemed a 9 10 threat to BCLC; correct? 11 Α That is correct, yep. As a result of -- I'd say we got our first one, I believe, in 2014. 12 2014. And if you turn to exhibit 18, please. 13 Q This 14 sets out the Extreme Risk Patron Program that was implemented in June of 2014; correct? 15 16 А Yes, that's correct. 17 Here it sets out under the heading "Process" Q that: 18 19 "The criteria for a 5-year barring relies 20 on information received from Law 21 Enforcement, criminal record abstracts, 22 media hits, and open source documents 23 available to Investigators. A 5-year 24 barring order may also be applied to 25 patrons who disregard AML directives and

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1		engage in activities that preclude BCLC	
2		from continuing a business relationship	
3		with that patron."	
4		Correct?	
5	A	Correct.	
6	Q	Then it sets out the specific criteria for an	
7		extreme risk barring; correct?	
8	A	Yes.	
9	Q	And it provides that:	
10		"The AML Unit actively monitors daily	
11		media incidents and updated Law	
12		Enforcement bulletins to identify	
13		potential persons of interest or safety	
14		concerns and conduct reviews as	
15		necessary."	
16		And was that part of your daily tasks at this	
17		time?	
18	A	Well, at the beginning, this was the this wa	as
19		the start of the Extreme Risk Program, so we pu	ıt
20		this together, a proposal was put together and	
21		approved to be put into place. And the main	
22		thrust of this was on the "extreme risk"	
23		category, which was the public safety concerns	
24		for having criminals, violent criminals and	
25		known vendors, gang members, in our sites. So	

1 that was -- that was our main initiative on 2 there. So it was something that -- I put this 3 report together and started the program, and 4 then we spent the first probably couple months 5 focused on just all the people that we had collected information on and were aware were in 6 7 our system and processed bans on those people. BCLC was provided with direct contact at CFSEU 8 Q 9 who you could contact if you had any pertinent 10 information related to any of their targets; 11 correct? 12 Yeah. So that was -- that was a spin-off of Α this process. So once we got the extreme risk 13 14 up and running, we were also in talks with 15 CFSEU. And as a result of that, we were advised of the list -- the PTEP list that they have and 16 17 what they use it for and what it contains. And as a result of obviously the fact that we have 18 19 this program in place now, we thought that that 20 would be a really good fit for us. So we 21 basically asked to share a copy of that PTEP 22 list.

23 So it wasn't a case of we were going back 24 and forth asking them. We asked them for a copy 25 of the entire list. It's over a thousand

1 people. And it's what they describe as their worst of the worst in BC, career active 2 criminals. And then we cross-match that with 3 4 our iTrak directory to identify players that we maybe didn't even know were in our system, they 5 were on their list. And that was part of this 6 public safety ban and added it to the program 7 for five-year bans based on their criminality 8 9 and associations.

What kind of information is on that list that 10 0 11 came to you from law enforcement, just the 12 person's name or other personal information? 13 А Yes. It's going to be -- I'm going to say 14 tombstone data of the individual, the gang 15 connections identified as to what gang. There 16 wasn't any investigational information provided 17 to us, so we didn't have information provided that would show that they were currently under 18 19 investigation by a specific unit or area or what 20 the charges were. So it was just people that 21 are on their list and it was made quite clear 22 that if you're on the list, you're on the list 23 for a reason, and it's a fairly serious risk, 24 and that was their main target group. 25 If you turn to exhibit 25, please. This is an Q

1		email from Kurt Bulow of CFSEU to John Karlovcec
2		dated June 17th, 2014. And I see that you are
3		not copied on this email, but I take it if
4		you've attached it to your affidavit you have
5		some familiarity with its contents. Correct?
6	A	Yes.
7	Q	In the second to last paragraph Officer Bulow
8		offers that:
9		"Dependent upon operational need, either
10		Cst. Emmerson or myself will be available
11		to attend your monthly Law Enforcement
12		agency briefing."
13		Correct?
14	A	Yes.
15	Q	Did that occur at that time?
16	А	I don't believe that they attended at any point
17		in time. To my recollection they did not.
18	Q	Do you know why that was?
19	A	I do not.
20	Q	Okay. You're aware
21	А	It's in June this is dated June 17th, 2014.
22	Q	Yeah.
23	А	And we were in contact with them directly in
24		June and July and in August. So I'm not sure if
25		it was as a result of I mean, we're obviously

1 in contact through that period. I don't know 2 that maybe there was a requirement to have them come in and attend, but I don't recall that 3 4 actually happening. Okay. CFSEU made four teams available to attend 5 Q a site orientation at the River Rock Casino in 6 or around June 2014; correct? 7 That's correct, yep. 8 А And was River Rock the focus of particular 9 Q 10 concern at this time? 11 Α Yeah. I would say everything centre focused on River Rock, everything we were doing. That was 12 kind of the centre of the universe for all the 13 14 problems that we were getting with Jin. Was that because Mr. Jin was primarily operating 15 0 out of River Rock? 16 17 The majority of his activities, yes. I mean, we А had -- the players that he normally routinely 18 19 delivered to did play at other casinos and would 20 attend, and he would go to or his associates 21 would go to those casinos for deliveries, but by and large the majority of the activity was 22 happening at River Rock. 23 24 Had River Rock seen a larger volume of cash Q 25 transactions than other casinos in the Lower

Mainland at that time as well? 1 2 Yeah. No, absolutely. And all the way through. Α 3 I mean, we always through our analytics group 4 and from the AML side, we keep pretty --5 track -- good track on levels of service coming from all five of the majors. We can see all the 6 different reports that are coming out of that, 7 and we could see all the time in almost every 8 9 graph or time slot that we did that it was a 10 very distinct difference between the level that 11 River Rock was reporting on, getting STRs on, 12 cash volume on, LCT reporting, as opposed to the 13 other four majors.

14 They were all clustered down at the bottom, 15 and they were all kind of made -- you know, fairly mid-range, but they were nowhere near the 16 17 level that River Rock was playing at. And that was consistent year to year to year. 18 That 19 wasn't as a result of blips. So that was --20 yeah, there was -- the majority of the stuff 21 that was happening, that was where it was going. 22 Okay. And ultimately you compiled a target Q 23 booklet of BCLC's top 10 casino cash 24 facilitators; is that correct?

25 A Yes, I did.

- 1QAnd those -- those cash facilitators, that2target booklet, if you will, is set out at3exhibits 28 to 37 of your affidavit; right?4AA
- 5 Q And those individuals, they are Mr. Jin and his 6 associates; correct?
- 7 A Yes, it is. By and large his associates, 8 runners and people that came to our attention 9 more often than not that may or may not be part 10 of his organization. We believed they were at 11 the time.
- I had a look at those, and I did not see Kwok 12 Q Chung Tam, but was he one of those targets? 13 He was not one of the targets that we put out in 14 Α 15 the top 10. We did it based on our intelligence at the time, and what -- the amount that we were 16 17 seeing the activity in the sites, Mr. Kwok Tam kept it fairly low profile. We did not see him 18 19 very often. He really was not one to hang 20 around the casinos. He didn't show up very 21 often.

22 But when he did some in, he was arranging 23 cash and depositing cash for very high-level 24 VIPs, but they were also shared by Jin, so that 25 was the anomaly for us. He's delivering to the

21

22

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24

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1 same person that Jin sometimes delivers to, and 2 that was kind of what we were trying to figure 3 out in the growth period. But we didn't see 4 Kwok Tam around. 5 And I don't think -- when we gave them a top 6 10, it was the people they were most likely 7 going to see in the activity at the time associated to Paul Jin and Paul Jin himself, 8 9 so -- but he was definitely -- he was 10 definitely -- in the early part he was 11 definitely -- one of the players that we brought to their attention as closely associated and a 12 13 person of interest in the project was Kwok Tam. 14 Okay. So in determining who was going to be on Q that top 10 list, did it have to do with 15 frequency of visits at the casino or volume of 16 17 cash or -- how did you make that determination 18 who were the top 10? I did it in consultation with the rest of the --19 А 20 a couple of the investigators and John. We

basically looked at Paul Jin as the primary, and

identified as a very close associate in terms of

then we looked at anybody else that we

working for him, so that would be the most

active ones that are doing deliveries on his

behalf, using his vehicles. If he'd give
 somebody his \$90,000 truck to deliver cash to a
 casino, I'm assuming he's got a pretty good
 relationship.

And then moving down, it was the last 5 probably four or five were people that we saw 6 7 repeatedly popping in and out of his connections 8 with players and that. They weren't players 9 themselves; they were people that were doing 10 some kind of activity that was suspicious based on cash facilitation for Jin or Jin's 11 associates. 12

- Q Okay. And were all those subjects in the targetbooklet banned province-wide?
- 15AI don't know at the time if they were all16banned. I think the majority of them were. I'm17not sure if all of them were banned status.

18 Q You say at paragraph 67 of your affidavit ...

19 A Sorry, go ahead.

20 Q You say:

"From 2011 to 2014, I observed that BCLC
investigators (and as of 2013 the AML
Unit) did not receive any reaction to or
feedback about these reports from FINTRAC
or GPEB, and was not receiving any

assistance from law enforcement on the 1 2 issues identified in the reports." 3 And I'm going to suggest that the statement is 4 incomplete given all of the interaction I've 5 just gone through that BCLC had in collaboration with CFSEU in 2014. Is that fair? 6 I'm going to say that that would be a fair 7 А 8 statement based on my observations from 2011 9 into 2014. I did not see any reaction from --10 or feedback from law enforcement. So I'm 11 looking -- and I specifically -- I think I 12 pointed out in here FINTRAC and GPEB, and we weren't receiving any assistance from law 13 enforcement. 14 15 The interactions that we had with CFSEU

started in February of 2014, and then those 16 17 interactions were us basically going to them asking for help and trying to pitch our project. 18 19 That continued all the way through. So we were 20 having he interactions. They weren't interactions in terms of reactive to our 21 22 problem: come help us do our project and target 23 Jin. It was us trying to engage them to target 24 Jin. So --

25 Q They did provide you with that list of

information that I referred to earlier; correct? 1 2 Yes, they did. But that is absolutely nothing Α to do with the Paul Jin side of the story. That 3 4 was -- that was PTEP list, worst of the worst criminals, that were in iTrak and possibly in 5 our casinos that we wanted to ban. 6 That wasn't anything to do with money laundering or cash 7 facilitation or Paul Jin's group. That was a 8 9 totally side table project that we were working 10 with that on. So just so you can -- you know 11 there's two different pieces to the puzzle here. The four teams from CFSEU that visited the River 12 Q Rock that -- it's your evidence that also had 13 14 nothing to do with Paul Jin and the cash facilitation issue? 15 When we brought people in to go through our 16 А 17 casinos and do tours through CFSEU, that was us reaching out to -- one, to bring them in and 18 show them the environment and that was part of

19 show them the environment and that was part of 20 that pitch, the pitch for the project. We 21 wanted to come in and show them what they had 22 access to, what we would provide, how we can 23 provide it, what the abilities are of the 24 surveillance operators and how we would be able 25 to assist them if they took a project on, going

1		into a casino under surveillance circumstances.
2		Where they've got a foot out tracking somebody,
3		walking, following somebody in as a suspect, how
4		they could actually maintain visual site on them
5		using the casino facility. So that's what those
б		were focused on. It was kind of acclimatization
7		of the environment.
8	Q	Okay. Kesi Wei was the first patron placed on
9		sourced-cash conditions; correct?
10	A	That's correct yes.
11	Q	And if you'd turn to exhibit 6, please. And
12	A	Yes.
13	Q	At the bottom here, this is an email from
14		Mr. Desmarais to Jim Lightbody and others dated
15		November 26, 2014; correct?
16	A	Yes.
17	Q	And you're not copied on this email, but I take
18		it it's attached to your affidavit, so you're
19		familiar with the contents; is that right?
20	A	Yes, I am.
21	Q	The subject line is "Kesi Wei," and
22		Mr. Desmarais says:
23		"This VVIP tried to come into the"
24		Well, "RR." And I take it that's River Rock;
25		right?

1 А Yes. 2 "... tried to come into the [River Rock] 0 3 with \$500K after being spoken to twice 4 about using cash originating from our person of interest." 5 Stopping there. Do you understand the term б "person of interest" to refer to Mr. Jin? 7 А Yes. 8 And so I take it that in 2014 Mr. Wei was a 9 Q 10 patron known to be receiving cash deliveries 11 from Mr. Jin, his known associates or persons driving his vehicles; correct? 12 13 А That's correct, yes. 14 And the email goes on to say that the River Rock Q declined to accept the cash. And then skipping 15 to the next sentence, it says: 16 17 "All LMD Casinos have been advised not to accept cash from this person and he will 18 19 be banned from cash play at our Casinos 20 until interviewed by BCLC investigators." 21 Correct? 22 That is correct, yes. А In your affidavit you say he was placed on 23 Q 24 sourced-cash conditions. Is that what "banned 25 from cash play" means?

А Yeah. And this incident that's being 1 Yes. referred to, I'm aware of this incident, that 2 3 came at that time where we were having fairly high-level discussions with the management of 4 BCLC, AML and River Rock because of Mr. Wei. He 5 was flagged, he was a problem and we were 6 7 collectively trying to come up with a battle plan. And after we had had conversations of 8 9 what we were going to do and how we were going 10 to do it and that allowed River Rock to approach 11 and make that sure he understood, he then came back with another 500,000 in cash, which is 12 13 basically saying yeah, whatever; I don't care 14 about your rules.

And that's what triggered this response. 15 16 This is why an email was forwarded. Because it 17 was significant in the fact that we've done everything we can possibly do to educate and 18 19 make him do what he should be doing and stop 20 using cash delivery, and he was refusing. So we 21 then placed him on sourced-cash conditions and that absolutely took out -- Mr. Jin right out of 22 23 play absolutely, unequivocally from that point 24 forward for him.

25 Q Okay. Turn to exhibit 77, please.

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1	MR.	STEPHENS: I think that might be in volume 2,	
2		Mr. Tottenham.	
3	THE	COMMISSIONER: I'm sorry, was that exhibit 77?	
4	MS.	LATIMER: Yes, 77.	
5	THE	WITNESS: Yes, I have that document.	
6	MS.	LATIMER:	
7	Q	Okay. In your affidavit you describe exhibit 7	77
8		as:	
9		"A rolling document I prepared including	
10		emails, information regarding large cash	
11		buy-ins and other documents related to AMI	ച
12		from 2014-2015."	
13		So can you first just explain, when did you	
14		create this document that's found at 77?	
15	A	I'm going to I can't give you an exact date,	ı
16		but it's going to be in and around probably	
17		November of 2014, around the same time this was	3
18		happening with Mr. Kesi Wei. It was kind of th	ıe
19		trigger that caused me to start this document	
20		and was documenting all the things that were	
21		going on with Kesi Wei between us and River	
22		Rock, and then it just kind of morphed into a	
23		bigger document as I continued forward. So the	at
24		was kind of the trigger and the period.	
25	Q	What was the purpose of the document when you	

1	
Т	

created it?

2 Α Originally it was because we had -- this was in 3 late 2014. We were crazy busy in what we were 4 doing and what we were trying to do. We had a 5 lot of irons in multiple fires and we were -- I was trying to keep track and document the 6 7 activities, the buy-ins that were coming in and the connectivity, and I'm doing it from an AML 8 9 perspective so I'm looking at -- solely at the 10 big files.

11 I don't have time and it wasn't part of my duties to drill down into each file. But I 12 13 wanted to get that -- snapshots of each one for me to -- to allow me to basically build a 14 15 chronology of what we're looking at so that when I go out to deal with, say, CFSEU, I've got 16 17 intelligence that I can easily refer back to to give me a synopsis of activities, say, over a 18 19 week or two weeks or three weeks. And then it 20 just continued, and I ended up doing this for a 21 year and a half.

22 Q And you'll agree that the information in here, 23 it's a bit of the grab bag and it refers to 24 different players and different cash 25 facilitators and all kinds of different

1 suspicious activities that were going on at this 2 time; is that fair? 3 А Yes. And I've tried to keep it chronological, 4 but it is, it's a grab bag of anything and 5 everything. It's anything that kind of fit in 6 our hemisphere of what we were looking at for 7 the large cash buy-ins, subjects, those kind of things, any interactions that we had. And I --8 9 most of this, you'll see, is cut and paste. 10 It's -- I pulled pieces outs of files that were 11 relevant and dropped them into here and tried to keep them in line so that we could monitor the 12 transactions and activities. And it's -- yes, 13 it's [indiscernible] horrible. 14

- Q Okay. I'm going to use this document to talk
 about a different player, Bin Sung Cao. And so
 I ask you to turn, please, to page 712 of this
 document.
- 19 A Yeah, I've got it.
- 20 Q And you see I'm looking at the last email on the 21 bottom. There's a red heading. It's an email 22 from Ross Alderson to Pat dated September 29th, 23 2014. Do you see that?

A Yes, I do.

25 Q And I take it -- he says "Hi Pat." I take it

1		this is Patrick Ennis that he's communicating
2		with. Is that correct?
3	A	Yes, that would be Pat Ennis.
4	Q	And the subject is "Bin Sung Cao"; correct?
5	A	Yes.
6	Q	And if you turn to page 713, it appears there
7		are a number of emails that come before this one
8		in chronology; is that fair?
9	A	Yes, that's correct.
10	Q	And if you look at the bottom of the page, this
11		is an email from Jerome, and I take it that's
12		Jerome Wakeland. Right?
13	A	That would be Jerome Wakeland, yes.
14	Q	And it's to Ross Alderson. And he says he
15		interviewed Lisa Gao regarding her involvement
16		in the incident and let her know that conditions
17		have been placed on this player.
18		"She will be speaking with him shortly to
19		arrange an information"
20		Sorry.
21		" to arrange an interview."
22		He goes on to say:
23		"The full interview summary should be
24		ready tomorrow."
25		But:

"One piece of information she provided was 1 2 concerning. 3 [the player] called Lisa and said he 4 was on his way to the casino with a 5 bunch of money and he would need help to carry it in. б 7 _ [She] was ... off-site at the time of 8 the incident, she received a call from 9 [a patron] and her information is 10 second hand. 11 [She] contacted security and guest _ services to meet with [the patron] and 12 escort the money into the casino." 13 And I've read that correctly? 14 15 Α Yep, I would say so. And why was that information concerning at the 16 Q 17 time? I don't know in the context of why -- I mean, 18 А these emails are going back and forth as 19 20 information pieces, and maybe it's -- I'm 21 assuming it's based on -- it's a person of 22 interest that we have that's getting cash deliveries. 23 24 Lisa Gao was a VIP guest services employee; Q 25 correct?

1 А She was guest services. That was a Yeah. 2 common occurrence with Lisa Gao and other people 3 like that in her employ that they would make 4 arrangements when the guests were coming in. 5 They would make arrangements to meet them or even go pick them up, take the cash in, drop it 6 7 at the cash cage, arrange meals. Do all that kind of stuff. That was their function, so 8 9 that's part of her role.

10QIs it a concern here that casino staff are being11asked to be involved in a cash facilitation12transaction?

13 It's always a concern when we have that kind of Α 14 activity, and I think ultimately the employee 15 that you're talking about was deregistered for that exact reason as a result of a file that 16 17 happened that we saw it involving a player that came in and did precisely a \$200,000 cash buy-in 18 19 that flagged us. And we subsequently looked 20 into it, and very quickly realized that there 21 was a problem with it in terms of her 22 participation. There was an investigation by 23 GPEB and she ultimately lost her GPEB licence 24 and her job over that.

25 So yes, it's always a concern to us. It's

_		
1		always been on our radar of employees,
2		especially VIP employees that have too tight of
3		a relationship with staff, so we need to we
4		normally would monitor those activities. And
5		again, I can't say that that was the context,
6		but I suspect that that played a part in it.
7	Q	Okay. In the email that comes just on top of
8		this one, Mr. Wakeland emails Bruno and says:
9		"Conditions have been added to Bin Shun
10		Cao's profile."
11		Correct?
12	A	Yes.
13	Q	We now see two spellings of this player's name,
14		but I take it they both refer to the same
15		player; is that correct?
16	A	I think so, yes.
17	Q	And Mr. Wakeland goes on to describe Mr. Cao's
18		usual play; correct?
19	A	Yes.
20	Q	And if you go to the top of this page,
21		Mr. Alderson asks that the same conditions be
22		placed on his slot play; correct?
23	A	So you're referring to you're on page 712,
24		are you?
25	Q	I'm on 713 at the top. Mr. Alderson says:

"Bruno: Yes please. Same conditions." 1 2 And if you look down, I think he's answering a 3 question that's asked in this email from Jerome. 4 Have we --5 MR. STEPHENS: Sorry, Ms. Latimer. I'm just orienting -- he's not with you just for a 6 7 second. So he's just catching up. 8 THE WITNESS: There we go. Yeah, okay. Go ahead. Based on what he says, we review the conditions. 9 10 MS. LATIMER: 11 0 Do you see the question in the middle of the page at the bottom of the email from Jerome it 12 13 says: 14 "Have we talked to the site about 15 preventing a patron with conditions from playing at the slot machines on the main 16 17 floor." 18 Α Yes. 19 0 And Mr. Alderson says: 20 "Yes ... Same conditions." 21 So he's asking that the same conditions be 22 placed on his slot play; correct? 23 А I would think so, yes. That's the way I would 24 interpret that. 25 Okay. And then he says: Q

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1		"We need to ask him directly what was in	
2		the blue bag and where the chips came	
3		from."	
4		Correct?	
5	A	That's correct, yep.	
б	Q	Was the concern here that this patron was	
7		accessing chips from a cash facilitator?	
8	А	Was that the concern? Sorry? Yes.	
9	Q	Yeah.	
10	A	I would say so, yes.	
11	Q	Okay. Because this was an issue at the time	
12		that cash facilitators were providing not only	
13		cash but also casino chips as a stored value	
14		instrument; correct?	
15	А	Yes, that's correct. We were that's a	
16		practice we were seeing commonly more	
17		commonly than we had previous.	
18	Q	Okay. And if you go back now to page 712, and	
19		the email I started with at the bottom.	
20		Mr. Alderson I'm looking at the second	
21		paragraph	
22	А	Yep.	
23	Q	of the email. Mr. Alderson says:	
24		"You are likely aware of an incident	
25		involving Cao and a person of interest	

1 yesterday. With the increased scrutiny 2 from GPEB in AML related issues BCLC are 3 taking the steps of speaking to the staff 4 involved to ensure their actions are 5 documented correctly." And so were you aware at this time in 2014 that б 7 GPEB was applying increased scrutiny in AML-related issues? 8 9 А Well, I think it would be fair to say that they 10 had -- they were taking an interest in what 11 was -- the files that were going on and we were having those discussions all the time when they 12 were inquiring about these kind of files and --13 14 yes, I would say, absolutely. And that increased scrutiny had the effect of 15 0 focusing BCLC's attention on compliance; 16 17 correct? Yeah. I think that was probably the gist of it. 18 А It was -- a lot of it came in the form of 19 20 questions in terms of directing us to take more 21 action or wanting us to take more action or 22 asking why we weren't taking more action. 23 Q Okay. And Mr. Alderson goes on to say: "I understand after the meeting Cao took a 24 25 blue bag to a hotel room in the West Tower

1 and I would appreciate if you could 2 confirm if the room was comped to Cao or 3 any other patron and if BCLC has any 4 financial involvement in the comp. 5 We would also like to speak to Mr. Cao to discuss the incident and at б 7 this time he is prohibited from buying in 8 with un-sourced chips and cash. His iTrak 9 profile will be updated to reflect. 10 I greatly appreciate your 11 assistance." And I've read that correctly; right? 12 13 А Yes, that's correct. Yeah. 14 Do you recall this issue with Mr. Cao bringing a Q 15 blue bag to a hotel room? I don't recall it independently, but I have 16 А 17 reviewed this -- part of this file as a result of dealing with a whole bunch of these files 18 19 over the last two or three weeks. And I'm aware 20 of that issue, and I confirm that that was in 21 fact a concern and what prompted some of the 22 activity and obviously the ban. And it's 23 consistent with some of the things that we were 24 seeing at River Rock at the time. 25 Was the concern here that a cash facilitator Q

1		might be operating out of that hotel room?
2	А	Yeah. Absolutely. We were looking at that in
3		other files where we were seeing, again,
4		commonalities.
5	Q	Okay. If you'd turn to exhibit 106, please.
6	A	Okay.
7	Q	I'm at page 897.
8	A	Yes.
9	Q	I'll just without reading it to you, I'm
10		asking you if you were aware in October 2014 of
11		an incident where the same patron arrived at the
12		River Rock with sorry, I didn't mean to say
13		"the same patron."
14		But were you aware in October 2014 of an
15		incident where a patron arrived at the River
16		Rock with two other Asian males and carried in a
17		large gym bag with \$469,960 in \$20 bills?
18	А	Yes.
19	Q	And the patron played one hand and got up and
20		took his chips to the cash cage to cash out;
21		correct?
22	A	That is correct, yep.
23	Q	But he was advised that he was going to be given
24		his small bills back, and so he opted not to
25		cash out and he left the casino and was seen

1 going to a hotel room on the 11th floor of the hotel; correct? 2 3 А That's correct, yes. 4 And you say here in this email at the bottom, Q which is an email from you to John Karlovcec and 5 others -- it's about five lines from the bottom. 6 7 You say: 8 "Clearly that room on the 11th floor is 9 being used as a supply point for this 10 group to cycle small bills and stockpile 11 chips for use with VIP clients." 12 Correct? 13 Α That's correct, yes. 14 And what group are you referring to there? Q 15 Α Again, I'm going back to Jin's group as a whole. Pretty well -- the majority of the stuff that we 16 17 were seeing all through this time, the common denominator was always Paul Jin or a subset of 18 19 his group. It was all tied to him. Until we 20 clarified Kwok Tam Lee [sic], I didn't see any 21 other amount of cash coming in in huge volumes 22 associated to other people that weren't tied to 23 Paul Jin. So any time we reference that, we are 24 referencing Jin's group. 25 And we were seeing, again, commonality in

1 files now where we were starting to see rooms 2 on -- in the hotel being used as congregation 3 points and people going up and down, meeting 4 people that are on ban lists who would go in 5 prior to them and then leave, and then the person would come in and then come back out and б 7 go down to the floor. 8 So our concern was they were trying to set 9 up inside the rooms to basically allow for an easier transition for cash facilitation in both 10 11 cash and chips and we were seeing the chips coming in as well at that time. 12 13 Q Okay. And you requested an action be taken to investigate this issue; correct? 14 15 А That's correct, yep. And BCLC investigators subsequently spoke to 16 Q 17 this patron; correct? 18 Yes. А 19 0 And do you recall that Patrick Ennis of the 20 River Rock then requested a meeting with BCLC to 21 discuss the approach to VIP patrons in this kind of situation? 22 23 А Yes. 24 And what was the result of that conversation? Q 25 I wasn't part of the conversation, А

1 unfortunately, so I don't think I could give you 2 very much comment on it other than I know they 3 were not happy with the way he was approached, 4 and again, similar to the complaints or concerns 5 we had heard, that they didn't like the idea of somebody being pulled off the floor. It was 6 embarrassing, they would potentially leave and 7 not come back and they'd lose them as a 8 9 customer, and they wanted to have a more 10 discreet way of getting the information that we were looking for. So that was their intention. 11

And I think that's ultimately what led into 12 13 that -- part of that program that we put together where you see the initial stages of 14 15 contact are through the service provider, VIP staff, in a kind of priority and priority 2, 16 17 which is a soft approach, education and then enforcement, and then ramped up to interview. 18 19 0 Okay. So again it was a concern being expressed 20 by the service providers about offending VIP 21 patrons; correct? 22 Α Yes. 23 Q And the concern was that they might lose the 24 customer; correct?

25 A That's what I took it as, yes, I believed.

1	Q	And that could negatively impact their revenue;
2		correct?
3	A	I would assume so, yes.
4	Q	And BCLC in response to that chose a different
5		course of action, which was to have the service
6		provider management interview the patron rather
7		than the BCLC investigator; correct?
8	А	Yes.
9	Q	So I'm going to take you back to the body of
10		your affidavit at paragraph 78. And I'm on the
11		fourth line of this paragraph. You say:
12		"I believe that, following the arrival of
13		[Mr.] Desmarais"
14		That was in 2013; correct?
15	A	Yep.
16	Q	"I believe that, following the arrival of
17		Desmarais and the development of the
18		AML Unit, investigators were no longer
19		worried about upsetting VIP patrons and
20		Service Providers."
21		I'd suggest to you that a more complete
22		statement would include that BCLC did continue
23		to adjust its behaviour in order to avoid
24		upsetting VIP patrons and service providers. Is
25		that fair?

No, I think it would be fair to say that we 1 А 2 recognized that they run a business, and we wanted to try and work with the service 3 4 providers to deal with the issues that we were 5 dealing with. I think it was -- I think it was reasonable that if their concern is we're 6 offending players and we're causing them grief, 7 that they should be allowed to deal with them. 8 9 Because quite often we found when we wanted 10 something done in the early days, if we went to the service provider and asked them to do an 11 approach as we did with the source of funds 12 programs that we did in source of wealth with 13 housewives and students, we asked them to do 14 15 that intelligence gathering at the front end because we felt it would be more effective and 16 17 we would have better results having them 18 approached by somebody that they have a 19 relationship with. And that -- we found that to 20 be really, really effective in those cases.

21 So I don't think this was too far off the 22 same thing. When I'm talking about a transition 23 when Brad Desmarais came in, it was a transition 24 and it was -- it's baby steps. It's a slow 25 transition. You don't go from 1 to 80; you

start and we work our way up. And we were
 working up with relationships, we were working
 up with relationships with the service providers
 and how we were going to apply the programs that
 we're putting in for banning and sanctions.

So it was kind of a gradual thing that we 6 7 were working up. They knew very quickly, the service providers -- and I'm going to suggest 8 9 that when I wrote this piece here, when we 10 weren't worried about them being upset, we gave 11 them an opportunity in that preamble that we've just referred to to go in and speak to the 12 13 patron and make it happen. However, they were 14 told flat out, if you don't make it happen, we 15 will take the next step and we will be doing an 16 interview, potentially banning or sourced-cash 17 conditions.

And that was part of our development. That 18 19 was us saying we're going to take it over from 20 there and they were not allowed -- they asked, 21 but they were not allowed to come into the interview. So I think it's kind of that 22 23 transition where you just kept -- you keep on 24 stepping up and up and up and that's part of 25 that process you're referring to. So I don't

think it was a definitive shift that contradicts 1 2 our -- my earlier statement. I think it's --3 just resembles the progression that we're making and how we were approaching it. 4 You do not mean to suggest in your affidavit 5 Q that it was night and day between Terry Towns 6 7 and Brad Desmarais in terms of their approach to whether BCLC investigators could approach VIP 8 9 patrons; correct? 10 I'm going to suggest that for the first three А years that I was there, 2011, '12 and '13, it 11 12 was very clear -- a clear message that we got as 13 investigators were -- our job function was 14 observe and report. We didn't have authority to 15 do criminal investigations or do any other work over and above that, and that was the direction 16 17 that we were given, and that included not to approach patrons and talk to them. 18 19 So I'm going to say based on that, my

perception at the time -- I can tell you my perception at the time was if I can't approach a VIP patron on the stand -- or on the floor and have a discussion with them, then putting cash restrictions or banning them or taking other action is probably off the table very quickly. However, when Brad Desmarais came in there was a
 shift.

3 And I'm not saying it was an overnight 4 light-bulb moment, but there was a very different shift in terms of how he assessed what 5 was going on, the activities and how we were б 7 going to approach it. And I -- to me that was a huge turn, that was a 180 pivot and allowed us 8 9 the ability to start going off in more 10 directions and taking more proactive and 11 progressive work that we were doing in about three different areas and become more aggressive 12 in terms of how we went after the information. 13

14 I mean, at the end of the day our mandate 15 is still and was still to observe and report. And I think we were probably pushing the 16 17 boundaries on that a number of times in terms of how we were doing that and working. I don't 18 19 think part of observe and report includes 20 proactively going out and trying to talk police 21 to come in and do an investigation at our sites. 22 That's what we were doing.

23 Q Okay.

24THE COMMISSIONER: Ms. Latimer, I'm just going to25interrupt for a moment. Is this an appropriate

Daryl Tottenham (for the commission) 103 Exam by Ms. Latimer 1 time to take an adjournment? 2 MS. LATIMER: Yes. 3 THE COMMISSIONER: Thank you. We'll take 15 minutes. 4 THE REGISTRAR: This hearing is adjourned for a 5 15-minute recess until 11:43 [sic] a.m. 6 (WITNESS STOOD DOWN) (PROCEEDINGS ADJOURNED AT 11:38 A.M.) 7 (PROCEEDINGS RECONVENED AT 11:52 A.M.) 8 9 THE REGISTRAR: Thank you for waiting. The hearing 10 is now resumed, Mr. Commissioner. 11 DARYL TOTTENHAM, a witness for the 12 13 commission, recalled. 14 MR. STEPHENS: Ms. Latimer, it's Mr. Stephens here. 15 I just wonder if I could just say one thing, a procedural matter, just before you start your 16 17 questioning, and if that's satisfactory. Mr. Commissioner. 18 19 THE COMMISSIONER: Yes. 20 MR. STEPHENS: It's Mr. Stephens here. Just as -- on 21 a procedural note. It has to do with the 22 affidavits, and I understand they haven't been 23 publicly posted yet pursuant to the practice, 24 but I just wanted to mention that -- you may 25 recall you issued a ruling on certain interviews

pursuant to a motion BCLC brought for a
 confidentiality order, and those interviews are
 now attached to one of those affidavits.

4 And in your ruling you gave liberty for BCLC 5 to apply for further prospective measures over some of it if they were tendered. And my б 7 instructions are BCLC will be applying -- and we will be doing this very soon -- for protective 8 9 measures over at least one of the attached 10 interviews, and I just wanted to note that for 11 you now. We will be doing that expeditiously, 12 but I just wanted you to be aware of my 13 instructions in that regard.

14THE COMMISSIONER: All right. So you're seeking a15direction that it not be posted until such time16that you've had an opportunity to bring that17application. Is that essentially correct?18MR. STEPHENS: That's correct. That's correct,

19 Mr. Commissioner. And if we -- if I could ask 20 that for both of the affidavits, please, simply 21 because there is an interview, at least one, in 22 affidavit number 1 as well as a great number in 23 affidavit number 2.

24THE COMMISSIONER: All right. Ms. Latimer, do you25take any position on that? Or Mr. McGowan?

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1	MS.	LATIMER: No.
2	THE	COMMISSIONER: All right. Thank you. I'll make
3		that direction.
4	EXAM	INATION BY MS. LATIMER:
5	Q	Now, Mr. Tottenham, if you could turn, please,
6		to exhibit 7. I'm going to have some questions
7		about that.
8	A	Okay.
9	Q	I'm at page 60 of this exhibit or sorry,
10		page 61.
11	A	61. Okay.
12	Q	And this is an email at the top of the page from
13		you to Brad Desmarais copying John Karlovcec
14		concerning Mr. Cao; correct?
15	A	That's correct, yes.
16	Q	And it's dated December 26, 2014. And in your
17		email you ask for "a priority dive on this guy,"
18		and you say you've added him to the HRP list;
19		correct?
20	A	That's correct, yes.
21	Q	And is that what does that stand for?
22	A	The deep dive is basically we do an open source
23		report. Basically build a dossier through our
24		analytics side of the AML. So we would be going
25		in and looking at anything and everything we can

1 find in open source data and any in tools that 2 we have to extract data on him, his company, 3 anything like that, and then do what's called a 4 dive. We drill into it. 5 And depending on the level of the dive, in 6 some cases -- and obviously these ones are the 7 ones that we -- when we do a deep dive we're looking into ownership houses, businesses, 8 9 partners, people on boards of directors right 10 down as far as we can go looking for any ties to 11 criminality or organized crime. So that's one half of it. That's the deep dive. And that's a 12 13 standard thing that we do in almost every

14 instance.

15And then the other part of that -- just16look at the --

17 Q I'm at page 62 of this exhibit.

Yeah. So that's part of that source of wealth 18 А 19 is that's literally how we confirm some of that 20 information, so we're going to go through and 21 use those tactics to try and get that 22 information. And then anything else that we're 23 taking on in terms of any -- I think it was 24 the -- the first reference was to action that we 25 were taking against him in terms of just --

yeah, just in the file information, the file
 investigation.

3 So we're looking at it kind of from two 4 different sides in the early stages to try and 5 determine what happened. And we're looking at 6 the background of who is this guy, get more 7 information and tie that together.

8 Q When you say you've added him to the HRP list,
9 does that stand for high-risk patrons?

10 A High-risk patron, yes.

11 Q All right.

12 That's a designation pursuant to the act for Α 13 high-risk patrons for what requires enhanced due 14 diligence under legislative requirements, the 15 act. There's criteria that places them onto the high-risk patron list, but we also have the 16 17 ability to insert somebody on based on our observations, concerns. 18

19 So in that regard I noted at the time that 20 he wasn't listed as a high-risk player, so 21 rather than wait until he has either, you know, 22 two transactions, two STR transactions or any of 23 the above, I wanted to get him flagged right 24 away because that flags him on watch, so it puts 25 him on watch on our system. It flags him as

1		high risk and it allows us to now start building
2		out as a high-risk player enhanced due diligence
3		that we have to do and maintain for FINTRAC
4		reporting and overwatch.
5	Q	Okay. You sent out some details of his history
6		of play. And then in the third paragraph on
7		page 62 you say:
8		"The anomaly from his play started on
9		December 23rd, 2014"
10		And you describe what you know about that at the
11		time. And that is that he arrived with a
12		female. And I guess the female was elsewhere
13		referred to LNU. Is that "last name unknown"?
14	A	Yes.
15	Q	Okay. And the female brought in \$250,000 in 20s
16		for table play; correct?
17	A	Yes, that's correct.
18	Q	And then he came back the next day with the same
19		female and had \$250,000 in cash, and the female
20		followed shortly after with another \$200,000
21		that she gave him; correct?
22	A	That's correct, yes.
23	Q	Now, if we go back to page 61, you recognize
24		this as an email in the middle from you. It's
25		dated December 30th, 2014, to Mr. Desmarais and

copying Mr. Karlovcec; correct? 1 Yes, that's correct. 2 Α 3 Q And you're providing an update here on this 4 player's activity and that you learned that the 5 River Rock had not reported two of his cash buy-ins for \$250,000 on each occasion and one 6 reason is because the first one was in 7 \$100 bills; correct? 8 9 Α That's correct, yep. 10 Did you understand in or around this time that Q 11 the River Rock was not reporting transactions as suspicious when they were made up of \$100 bills? 12 We came to understand that that was happening. 13 А Not at -- we didn't know it at this time, but it 14 15 came to our attention in around that time as a result of an investigation we were doing on 16 17 similar files like this where we found large cash buy-ins that were receipted by LCT through 18 19 to FINTRAC, properly receipted to FINTRAC but 20 had no corresponding UFT file to show that it 21 was flagged for review by us and clearly, based 22 on the amount of the buy-ins, would have 23 automatically or should have automatically 24 triggered UFT file creation for us to review. 25 So as a result of those, we then became

1 aware and took an initiative to look and yes, 2 discovered that that in fact appeared to be a practice that was happening, and ultimately at 3 4 the end of our search at least the period of a 5 year and a half where we're seeing some incidents like this happening depending on who 6 7 was working. And was that inconsistent with FINTRAC 8 Q 9 requirements? 10 Yes, it was. Α 11 0 Did you know that GPEB had flagged this concern back in 2012? 12 That they had flagged specifically this 13 А incident? 14 Not this incident, but the concern that River 15 Q 16 Rock was not reporting transactions conducted in 17 \$100 bills? I was not aware. I'm not aware of any report or 18 А anything that came out of GPEB that I can recall 19 20 off the top of my head. I'm not aware of that. 21 I can tell you that if -- any time we come 22 across information like this, I mean, we have a 23 very, very focused program in terms of 24 compliance with FINTRAC reporting and anything 25 that has to do with the act, we would absolutely

1 have gone after this, which we did. We found 2 this by -- pretty well by fluke initially. And 3 then the next day by digging into it and looking 4 for more, found more, and then basically created 5 an investigation and advised FINTRAC and did a notification to FINTRAC that -- what we'd found 6 and went through that entire process of finding, 7 fixing, resolving all the way through and 8 9 retraining. 10 So it's something that would be very concerning for us, and I can tell you if we knew 11 12 about it, that there was something going on, we absolutely would've acted on it. And this was 13 14 the first I had heard was happening once we started digging into it. 15 Okay. I'm back at your email, and I'm maybe 16 Q 17 about six lines from the bottom of your email,

and you've -- what you've done is describe additional transactions from this player between December 24th and 27th. And then you say: "It his total buy-in's during these 6 days

is at 1.4 million, much of which is in

23 small bills."

24 And that's consistent with your recollection of 25 this incident that you're describing?

1 Α Yes. 2 Okay. If you go back to page 60. This is an 0 email from Mr. Karlovcec to Mr. Desmarais and 3 4 copying you, and it's dated December 31, 2014, 5 and it's about the same patron. Are you with 6 me? 7 Α Yes. 8 And Mr. Karlovcec reports on another large cash Q 9 buy-in using small denominations; correct? 10 That's correct, yes. Α 11 Q And then about five paragraphs down he says this is starting to be very similar to the Kesi Wei 12 13 situation; correct? 14 That's correct, yes. Α And was the suspicious at this time that this 15 0 player was also receiving cash deliveries from 16 17 Jin or his associates or persons driving his vehicles? 18 19 А And I can't say absolutely from reading what 20 I've got in front of me here that it was tied 21 directly to Jin, but I can say that he was 22 clearly receiving cash transactions brought to him, deliveries, and going through volume of 23 24 cash. They would be consistent with what we 25 would expect, and there was no other group that

1		I am aware of that was able to provide this kind
2		of this level of cash. So I would say it's
3		probably a likely assumption that it is.
4	Q	Okay. And he goes on to say he's going to speak
5		with River Rock management to speak to the
б		player, much like we did the Kesi Wei to
7		determine source of funds and encourage the use
8		of his PGF account; correct?
9	А	That's correct, yes.
10	Q	And so this is what we were talking about
11		before, the first step here, and you say it was
12		a progression. And the first step is that the
13		service provider management would speak to the
14		VIP player; right?
15	A	Yes.
16	Q	And only if that didn't resolve it would BCLC
17		investigators step in; correct?
18	A	That's correct.
19	Q	And in the next paragraph he says:
20		"I recognize that we do not want to
21		jeopardize revenue however if the dialogue
22		does not garner the intended results we
23		may need to have our investigators have a
24		chat with him and/or look at imposing
25		additional restrictions relative to his

Daryl Tottenham (for the commission) 114 Exam by Ms. Latimer 1 use of cash to play." 2 Correct? 3 А Yes. 4 So at this time in December 2014 I'm going to Q suggest that BCLC had a shared interest in not 5 jeopardizing revenue. Is that fair? 6 I -- you know, I can't speak to -- in what 7 Α context that John -- it's his email -- in what 8 9 context he was using that phrase. I've used 10 that phrase before too. 11 However, from my perspective, any time I've used that, we have always -- I have always 12 approached it as the revenue of service 13 provider. That is our main interest when we're 14 looking at that. So we're always thinking in 15 terms of, this guy that we're dealing with, with 16 17 Mr. Cao, if we'd taken action on it -- if we allow the service provider to deal with him 18 19 directly and resolve it, that's a win/win for 20 everybody because then we've resolved the 21 problem. But ultimately if we have to take an action on them and we ban him or we do 22 sourced-cash conditions, it's going to impact 23 24 the service provider in terms of revenue. 25 I mean, in the larger picture, yes, it will

1 impact obviously revenue from BCLC, but I can 2 tell you absolutely and equivocally from the 3 time I started in 2014 that was never given one 4 interest of -- from our unit and from the way that we approached our issues for revenue, 5 losses or projections, that was not something 6 that we dealt with or worried about. Our focus 7 was how to deal with the patrons. 8

9 And in this case he had a PGF account and he 10 was using this PGF account, and then he's got this anomaly where all of a sudden he starts 11 12 playing at a much higher level with cash, and they're cash deliveries. So to me that's a 13 14 deviation. It's a FINTRAC indicator, but it's a 15 deviation from behaviour. And that is a guy 16 that is probably, if we approach it the right 17 way, through the service providers, is likely 18 going to be resolved by them saying, if you 19 don't stop this, you will get sourced-cash 20 conditioned or you'll get banned and allow them 21 to get him back to using PGF and financial institutions and bank drafts. 22

And then us saying at the back end, here's your opportunity; you either fix it or we'll fix it; when we fix it, it's going to be

sourced-cash conditions and banned or worse. 1 So 2 I mean, that's the only way I can -- sorry, it's 3 a lengthy answer, but that's kind of how we 4 approached it and that's how we dealt with this, 5 and that's what I would have been doing, and I suggest that's what John was implying in what we 6 were doing. Our intention was you can deal with 7 this and get it back into his PGF, but if you 8 9 don't, game on. Okay. What happened to Kesi Wei when he went on 10 Q

10 2 0 may: made mappened to meet well well meet meet to meet to

Kesi dropped off the map a bit. He did continue 13 Α 14 play. I mean, he had a fair amount of play. 15 He's -- to my recollection he's -- he's never 16 stopped playing up until -- unless he got a ban, 17 which he did get a ban at one point. But he wasn't able to play at the levels of play that 18 19 he was playing at before. We did have a number 20 of files.

I mean, he was under our radar heavily, so when he did come back and was playing -- he had a period that he didn't play at all. When he did come back and started playing, he tried a couple of things in terms of directing others,

1		having others buy in for him and then he would
2		stand and direct play from the side of the
3		table. So there was a number of issues that we
4		had to deal with him. So he was still trying to
5		come back in, but he wasn't playing anywhere
6		near the same level.
7	Q	And was Mr. Cao put on cash conditions?
8	А	Jia Gao?
9	Q	Yeah. No, sorry.
10	A	Oh, sorry. Mr. Cao?
11	Q	Yes.
12	A	I don't know if it addresses it in this report.
13		I'm going to say yes, he was. At one point I'm
14		aware that he was on conditions. What is the
15		date of this one? I'll go back and see the date
16		here. December yeah, I'm not sure of his
17		status at that time, but I know there was a file
18		that I recently reviewed in 2015 and confirmed
19		that Mr. Cao was put on sourced-cash conditions.
20		And I think it was in relation to the build out
21		of our sourced-cash source of funds program
22		and our sourced-cash conditions program, which
23		rolled out in April of 2015, and they went into
24		play around July. And then we had our first
25		we had Kesi prior to that, but then we had Jia

1 Gao, and then we had a whole flurry of players 2 that were put on on September 11th in 2015. And I believe in the top probably 30 or 40 entries 3 4 of people that we'd placed on -- they were all 5 our highest rollers that we put on sourced-cash conditions that he was one of them. And his 6 7 date that he went on, I'm thinking it's late September 2015. I'd be able to check that if 8 9 you want it. 10 Do you recall what happened to Mr. Cao's play Q when he went on sourced-cash conditions? 11 On this -- for -- specific to this? 12 Α 13 Yeah. Did it dip, or was it the same, or did he Q use his PGF account? 14 15 А Again, I haven't had the opportunity to go in and look at a full picture. I could find that 16 17 out very easily. But my recollection from what I have seen is that he did revert back to using 18 19 his PGF, but I can tell you once we got to this 20 stage here, and when we refer to him as, this is 21 becoming a Kesi Wei, I mean, he was obviously -at the front end he was our kind of worst-case 22 scenario that we had to deal with and our 23 24 biggest problem. So a lot of reference goes 25 back to another Kesi Wei moment.

1 I would suggest that pretty well 2 everybody that we -- if we said that they were 3 one of these people that is at that same level, 4 that we would have dealt with them accordingly 5 in the same manner that we dealt with Kesi, which would have been all the way going through 6 7 to sourced-cash conditions, heavy monitoring and potentially a ban if they refused to cooperate. 8 9 Q Okay. And BCLC met with FSOC in February 2015; 10 correct? 11 А That's correct, yes. And then at paragraph 125 of your affidavit you 12 Q 13 say that by April 2015 FSOC communicated that 14 they "had observed Jin meeting with suspected 15 high-level members of criminal organizations"; is that right? 16 17 Sorry, I'm just catching up there. А This binder's, like, 5 inches thick. 18 19 0 Paragraph 125 is where I was looking. 20 MR. STEPHENS: Page 25, Mr. Tottenham. 21 THE WITNESS: I'm getting close. 22 MR. STEPHENS: Closing in. THE WITNESS: There we go. Sorry. Okay. Go ahead. 23 24 MS. LATIMER: 25 Well, I'm about -- I'm on the second line. You Q

1 say: "After three weeks of surveillance in or 2 3 about April, 2015, I understood from 4 discussions with certain FSOC members that FSOC had observed Jin meeting with 5 suspected high-level members of criminal б 7 organizations." 8 And my understanding is that the E-Pirate 9 investigation commenced from there. That was 10 your understanding at that time, correct? 11 А That is correct, yes. Now, after Kesi Wei, the next target that BCLC 12 Q focused on was Jia Gao; correct? 13 14 That's correct, yes. Α 15 He was -- in terms of -- you say he was the 0 biggest -- might have been the biggest patron in 16 17 the province at that time; right? 18 Consistently, yes. А 19 0 And the AML Unit suspected he was receiving 20 cash, at least in part, from Mr. Jin or his 21 associates? 22 That is correct, yes. А 23 Q And if we go back to exhibit 38, please. 24 Okay. А 25 I'm at page 372. And if you look in the third Q

column of this table, I'm looking at the date 1 2 6 October 2014. And are you with me? 3 А Yep. 4 Q And this shows that Mr. Gao had a buy-in for over \$300,000 and that the vehicle delivering 5 the cash was associated to Mr. Jin and it was 6 7 suspected that Mr. Jin was in fact the driver; 8 correct? 9 Α That's correct, yes. 10 And then if you go back to exhibit 5. Q Okay. I bookmarked it. 11 А Sorry to flip around. 12 Q Okay. Go ahead. 13 Α I'm on page 53. And if you look at the column 14 Q 15 on the left, the date I'm looking at is the 8th of April 2015. And this shows another buy-in on 16 17 this date for Mr. Gao that Mr. Jin was indirectly involved in; correct? 18 19 Α That's correct, yes. 20 And those were just the buy-ins that related Q 21 indirectly to Mr. Jin, but Mr. Gao also had a 22 large number of suspicious transactions that may 23 or may not have been directly -- or may or may 24 not have been associated to Mr. Jin; is that 25 fair?

1 A	Yeah,	that's	fair	to	conclude.	Yes.
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- 2 Q And some of those were -- involved other known 3 cash facilitators; right?
- 4 A Yes.
- 5 Q And was that common at the time that VIP players 6 might associate with more than one cash 7 facilitator?
- Well, I think -- the commonality, I think, 8 А 9 though, is between our observations and then the 10 things that we were doing with our analytics 11 group of AML on Bal Bamra's side, we were able to take a lot of this information and tie it all 12 together. So when we do a link chart, we can 13 14 see the vehicles and people all associated, and 15 in that kind of an application it makes it very, very clear where the definitive links are. 16

17 And we did that for Paul Jin, and it was very easy to see where the links are. So we 18 19 could see that there was some kind of link into 20 almost all these players that we were dealing 21 with. What we didn't see was we didn't see one 22 incident where somebody outside of that circle 23 was making the high-level cash deliveries with a 24 totally different subset of people and no 25 commingling between the Jin group, which would

indicate that there's at least two groups
 working.

So all the way through -- from literally 3 4 when we first started and all the way through, after we confirmed Kwok Tam's -- his designation 5 6 in that group, it was clear to us that there was only one major organization working. And when 7 I'm saying that, I'm saying "major" as in the 8 high volume. There was probably a lot of other 9 10 small subgroups that had nothing to do with Jin, 11 working in the low range, in 10-, 15-, 20 thousand kind of loan shark activities on the 12 13 floor, but this was something that was very, 14 very specific, and I think that's fair for me to say it was all interconnected with Jin. 15 Okay. Could you turn, please, to exhibit 77, 16 Q 17 and I'm looking at page 626. MR. STEPHENS: 676? 18 19 MS. LATIMER: 626, please. 20 MR. STEPHENS: Oh, sorry. 626. Thank you. 21 THE WITNESS: Okay. MS. LATIMER: 22 23 Q I'm looking at the very bottom of the page. 24 There's the date February 2nd, 2015. 25 А Yep.

Jia Gao is noted, and there's a request to have 1 0 2 staff approach him. And I take it this is you 3 writing, you say: 4 "Writer was reviewing files and noted several large cash buy-ins from Jia 5 Gao ... totalling in excess of 1.3 million б 7 in small bills and utilizing a known cash 8 facilitator for cash deliveries." 9 Correct? 10 А That's correct, yep. 11 0 And then if you go to the next page, you -- in the second entry here you arranged for 12 13 investigators to "contact Villa management and 14 have Gao approached and spoken to"; correct? 15 А That's correct, yes. And that's that same approach where you go to 16 Q 17 the service provider to deal with the patron first; right? 18 19 Α Yes. 20 Okay. And the summary of information received Q 21 below is that Mr. Gao had over -- I am looking 22 at where there's a redaction there, it basically 23 says his total suspicious buy-ins were over 24 \$1.1 million over two gaming days, and that included over \$880,000 in \$20 bills; correct? 25

1 A That's correct, yes.

2 Q And then if you go to page 634.

- 3 A Okay.
- Q On February 16th you sent a request to Grand
 Villa management to have Mr. Gao spoken to about
 the buy-ins in small bills and about not using
 his PGF account; correct?
- 8 A Yep.
- 9 Q And the next day, on February 17th, he had been 10 spoken to by Villa staff and his account 11 information was updated. And it says here that 12 Gao understands he must use his PGF account and 13 not be passing large amounts of chips freely 14 while on the gaming property; correct?
- 15 A Correct.
- 16 Q But when it says he must be using his PGF 17 account, he's not on cash conditions at this 18 time, is he?

19 A No, he's not.

20QSo it's -- when it says he must use his PGF21account, is that -- what does that mean?

22 A I think it said:

23 "... but understands he must be using his
24 PGF account and not be passing large
25 amounts of chips freely."

1 So the definitive part of that is he must be using it; it's not he was misusing it. It is he 2 3 must stop using the cash and use his PGF, which requires bank drafts. 4 Okay. So was that a condition placed on his 5 Q play at this time? 6 7 Α So for Mr. Jia Gao, again, because of his -- he was the number one, pretty well the top dog in 8 9 the province at that point in time, there was a 10 lot of -- I'm going to call it background 11 meetings and discussions on how we're going to deal with it with the service provider. We 12 13 wanted to make sure we did it absolutely 14 properly, but it had to be done quickly. 15 So yes, we did proceed and he ended up going -- in April he ended up going onto sourced-cash 16 17 conditions. Based on the fact that he was gaming at a huge level, we knew that was going 18 19 to have a significant impact with the service 20 provider and there was going to be a problem 21 when that happened that we needed to control.

So that was part of the discussions as we were going through this. And as we were seeing this kind of activity, we reached out to them, as we did in this file, to give them an opportunity to

22

23

24

reign him in and get him on track, knowing that
 if he refuses the fallout will be he'll have the
 sourced-cash conditions.

4 So that's how we proceeded with it and 5 that's kind of how we went ahead with the 6 actions that we took and subsequently placed him 7 on sourced-cash conditions just after this 8 period.

9 Q Okay. I'm at page 639 of this exhibit. And 10 here it says on March 24th, 2015, it's reported 11 that the -- so I'm looking down at the bottom. 12 It's reported that the previous day, March 23rd, Mr. Gao was involved in a similar incident. 13 Ιt 14 involves him "conducting a large cash buy-in for 15 approximately \$290,000 in small bills and upon review it was learned that this cash was 16 17 delivered to the casino and passed off to Gao."

18 And it says that:

19 "The subject delivering the cash was not 20 100% identified but it is believed to 21 be --"

And there's a SID number there. And is it fair to say because there's a SID number that the subject who delivered the cash was known to BCLC?

1	A	Yeah. I think when they put the SID number in
2		they it was probably a vehicle that was
3		similar in vehicle style of a vehicle that was
4		used commonly by Jin's group. But it does go on
5		to say:
6		"A plate was not obtained as they stayed
7		off camera in the parking lot."
8		So I'm sure they recognized the vehicle and they
9		tried to get as best shot as they could from a
10		distance, and they believe it is somebody
11		that and that's who they've quoted in the SID
12		number.
13	Q	Okay.
14	A	But not confirmed a hundred percent.
15	Q	Okay. And then if you look over the page. And
16		I'm at the second line in the top paragraph
17		there. You say:
18		"I am satisfied that he was advised about
19		the chip/cash passing issue and the need
20		to utilize his PGF account but not so
21		confident they clearly outlined our
22		concern with him using cash
23		facilitators Notwithstanding Gao's
24		extreme wealth and the obvious
25		sensitivities when dealing with him, we

1cannot ignore AML risks and allow him to2bend to rules. We have completed a deep3dive on Gao and can confirm his source of4wealth and lack of any adverse media but I5believe we are obligated to re-address6this issue at this point.

My suggestion at this point is that 7 8 BCLC investigators or you (preferably) 9 contact the [General Manager] Randy Sears 10 and explain this situation and direct him 11 to re-approach Gao and have another conversation with him specifically on the 12 cash facilitation issue. He needs to be 13 advised that if he continues to have cash 14 15 delivered to the casino in this manner, we 16 will be applying sanctions on his gaming 17 status which could impact his ability to 18 gamble in BC."

19And you set out that it needs to be documented20and so on.

21 And when you say in this email that there 22 are obvious sensitivities, is that -- are you 23 referring to the volume of play and the impact 24 on revenue that dealing with this patron may 25 result in?

1 А I'm referring to -- again going back to Yeah. 2 the service providers in terms of this is their biggest client. This is -- this could likely 3 have an impact on their business, so that we 4 need to show that we've done everything possible 5 to correct the behaviour because in this sense 6 that's what we had agreed to in our process was 7 to use whatever resources we could to work with 8 9 the patron and the service provider in the first 10 instance, and then if they failed to abide by 11 that, then accelerate up as needed. So that's 12 what I'm referring to when I'm talking about -in there. It's -- I know it's a sensitive 13 14 matter.

15 And certainly when conversation about 16 possibly putting Jia Gao came up, and we were 17 talking about putting him on sourced-cash conditions because that -- you've got to 18 19 remember, only Kesi Wei had been on sourced-cash 20 conditions at this point, so this is a new thing 21 coming out. It got a lot of attention. It got 22 a lot head snap on this one because they are 23 looking at the biggest player in the province 24 who potentially may not be able to play in BC 25 anymore. And that's what they were seeing, so

1

yes, it was huge.

2 0 And when you say "we cannot ignore AML risks and allow him to bend the rules," up to this point 3 4 in March had Mr. Gao basically been allowed to bend the rules, the anti-money laundering rules? 5 No. What I'm referring to in there is that 6 Α 7 we've -- the service provider has spoken with him and told him what the rules are and what he 8 9 has to abide by, and if he doesn't, what's going 10 to happen. That was part of our initial 11 agreement with him.

I was confident that Randy had that 12 conversation with him. I wasn't so confident 13 14 that Jia Gao took it seriously or cared enough 15 that he was going to follow. And similar to what we saw with Kesi Wei, he did come back once 16 17 we put sourced-cash conditions on and then he started going off on all these tangents of using 18 19 directed play, having people buy in for him, all 20 these games that he was playing. So we just had 21 to keep on escalating to the point of outright 22 banning.

23 We were kind of on the same track with Jia 24 Gao now saying, if we have this discussion -- or 25 they have this discussion and it's ignored, then

we have a discussion and we put on sourced-cash
 conditions. If they're not taken seriously, our
 escalation is to ban. So there's no halfway
 point once we go.

So it's not a case that he was never allowed 5 to bend the rules. I mean, I think it was 6 7 pretty clear by the actions that we took day to day in how we approached big names, big talent, 8 9 cash, was very, very clear that we weren't 10 prepared to bend the rules. I think the Drake 11 incident at Parq is a perfect example. We didn't bend the rules. We wouldn't for Jia Gao, 12 but he had to understand that we were serious 13 14 and he was about to get banned, and that's what 15 that paragraph actually says, that one line. 16 Basically it says the next action taken will be 17 conditions, will be taken by us.

So we've put him on notice at that point to say -- and we did. If you look at when he was banned, his ban date follows shortly after this. He came back, had more tomfoolery and we banned him.

23 Q Okay. If you look at the next entry on the 24 page. It's March 26th. Brandon writes in the 25 middle of the page -- he's talking about --

1 talking to Bill Lang, Executive Director, VIP, 2 Gateway Casinos. He says at the end of the 3 first paragraph: 4 "... let Bill know that Mr. Gao's activity 5 in this incident is not acceptable and that Mr. Gao needs to be educated to avoid б 7 repeating this type of activity." 8 And then he says -- oh, sorry. Can you go to 9 page 641. And I'm at the middle of the page. 10 There's a heading there, "Jia Gao Update From 11 Brandon: March 26, 2015." 12 Oh, right. Okay. Yes. Α And then the sort of -- there's a bunch of 13 Q bullet points in that entry. And just above 14 15 that it says -- Brandon writes: "Discussed was the following in relation 16 17 to Gao." 18 Α Yep. " _ Cash drop offs at the site are not 19 0 20 encouraged as they present a safety 21 and security risk for him and other 22 patrons/staff. 23 That Gao is encouraged to utilize his _ 24 PGF Account (bank drafts) whenever 25 possible as he has been doing so often

in recent months." 1 2 There's a redaction. And then it says: 3 "_ That further activity by Gao such as 4 this may result in further interviews 5 conducted by BCLC investigators." б And he says: 7 "Bill seemed to be receptive to the idea 8 and agrees that the idea of having cash 9 facilitators on site does not look good, 10 and is not good for business." 11 And I've read that correctly? 12 Yes. Α Is the fact that cash dropoffs were not 13 Q 14 encouraged something that was being communicated 15 to VIP patrons? I'm going to suggest that this, I think, came 16 А 17 from one of our investigators and was sent to his boss. The phrases that are being used here 18 19 are not something that I would normally see, and 20 they're certainly not something I would use. So 21 I don't know that I can speak to this and what 22 was said and why it was said. 23 I mean, I'm reading it as you are and I 24 haven't probably seen this for five years. But

this is not the kind of terminology and phrasing

1 that I would normally use or we would use when 2 we're doing it. I don't think it would send an 3 appropriate message. However, that's what was 4 done at the time, but we did carry it through as 5 we said that we were going to and put him on restrictions and sourced-cash conditions. 6 7 Q You agree that that language that's used in this 8 communication seems like a pretty light touch as 9 a way of expressing a prohibition on cash 10 facilitation at a casino; correct? 11 А Yes. And in this case because it came -- it 12 basically came chronologically after we had already dealt with him on a couple of instances. 13 14 We're at the point now of last chance cleanup or tomorrow you're gone, type of thing. So that's 15 from Bill Lang. I don't know how that 16 17 conversation went or if it happened, but yes, that's not to me what I would have -- the 18 19 terminology that we would have used when we were 20 doing it. The idea that cash facilitators on site doesn't 21 Q 22 look good or is not good for business, that's --23 that wasn't BCLC's concern at that time; 24 correct?

25 A Our concern -- in terms of cash dropoffs at the

1 site, there's two things there. One is they weren't encouraged; they were prohibited. I 2 3 mean, we -- that was the subject of many of our 4 programs and the focus of a lot of our work and 5 energy was to identify those cash dropoffs. That being said, we came across incidents where 6 7 somebody had a cash dropoff and it turned out that a father called his son and brought money 8 9 down that he had in his vault at home. 10 So it's not in every instance it's a 11 nefarious, suspicious event, but it certainly looks it on the front end. The majority of them 12 13 are, though. The majority of them are 14 suspicious dropoffs and that's how we treat 15 them. In terms of the second half of that, 16 17 they're talking about a security risk for him and other patrons and staff. That has always 18 19 been kind of a background part of this argument.

We've always raised a point from early in the -in I guess my days back at Starlight as an investigator is that we needed to explore cash alternatives to stop people from coming in with cash.

25 And part of that concern wasn't just the

source of funds; it was the fact that we're 1 having people coming in with \$200,000 in cash 2 3 and walking off the street or their car with 4 that amount of cash and then possibly leaving at 3 o'clock in the morning by themselves with a 5 half a million dollars in cash because that's 6 7 how you get paid out, in cash. And we didn't have any other ways to handle it at the time in 8 9 the early days.

10 So that's been a consistent theme. Tt. 11 hasn't been the centre part of our focus, I can 12 tell you that much, simply because of the issues 13 that we've got in what we were trying to deal 14 with for Jin's group and the cash coming in. 15 But that's always been part of the equation. So when you see that, it's -- it doesn't -- it's 16 17 not a surprise that I see something like that in It makes sense. But it's clearly --18 there. 19 from with what we're looking at right now in 20 this instance for Jia Gao, that's clearly not 21 our concern.

Q Okay. And when he says "further activity by Gao such as this may result in further interviews," at this point in time, given the number of cash facilitation incidents that occurred, would --

why wouldn't further activity result in a
 sourced-cash requirement or a banning, for
 example?

4 Yeah, and, again, the best I can say is I was А not the author of this and it's not my language. 5 It's not language that I would have used. 6 It's not an approach I would have used. I can assure 7 you that from my perspective and the AML 8 9 perspective when we were dealing with this, when 10 we got to a situation like this where we're at 11 that last point, it would be very clearly laid out, and we would follow up on that activity. 12

So this to me -- yes, it reads soft, it 13 14 reads, we'll go back and reinterview, and to me 15 that would probably not have been an appropriate move at that point. And it's not something that 16 17 we would have likely followed. And like I say, I think you'll see he got his sourced-cash 18 19 conditions shortly after this. So we do get 20 copies of these reports. We see what's 21 happening because we're monitoring all of these 22 files. So it's something that we likely would 23 have looked at and followed up. And we may not 24 have seen this portion of it, but clearly we 25 would have seen that report itself.

1	Q	Okay. I'm at page 642. Here there's the
2		heading "April 1, 2015" sort of near the top.
3		"Jia Gao Follow Up to Bruno - New Incident."
4		This is an email from you to Bruno; correct?
5	A	Yep.
6	Q	You write and report that Gao has chosen to move
7		to another venue as his last seven large cash
8		transaction reports have popped up at one at
9		Edgewater and six at River Rock; correct?
10	A	M'mm-hmm.
11	Q	And I take it that this is exactly what the
12		service provider would have been concerned about
13		at this time, that focused AML attention might
14		cause a customer to move to the competition;
15		correct?
16	A	Yes.
17	Q	And you say:
18		"Last night Gao received his 300K cash
19		buy-in from one of the vehicles
20		flagged to Guang Zhou, who is [prohibited]
21		for 5 yrs for loan-sharking activities and
22		is an active cash facilitator."
23		And I've read that correctly?
24	A	Yes.
25	Q	Does that active cash facilitator was he also

Daryl Tottenham (for the commission) 140 Exam by Ms. Latimer known to be associated to Paul Jin? 1 2 Yes, I believe he was. Α 3 0 And you say: 4 "We need to send a consistent message to Gao and ensure that he knows that jumping 5 casino's [sic] will not mask his б activities to BCLC and that using cash 7 8 facilitators to deliver cash to the casino 9 will not be tolerated and will end with 10 sanctions against him." And your recommendation that follows is that: 11 "[River Rock] investigators speak to 12 [River Rock] management and explain the 13 14 previous warning to Gao received about the 15 need to utilize his PGF account as often as possible." 16 17 And that further incidents like this "is likely going to result in sanctions being placed upon 18 19 his play" and ultimately could lead to a 20 barring. 21 And then you say: 22 "I realize the sensitivity dealing with 23 him as his revenues are substantial and I 24 believe allowing [River Rock] management 25 the opportunity to deal with him in this

1 instance is appropriate." 2 But if that's not effective, you go on to say: 3 "BCLC interviews without [River Rock] 4 staff on hand to deal with him --" Is sort of what comes next. 5 б And you agree there that you're recognizing 7 this ongoing sensitivity in interviewing this VIP patron because of the significant impact 8 9 that doing that is going to have on revenue; 10 correct? 11 Α Yes. 12 So when you say in your affidavit that Q investigators were no longer worried about 13 14 upsetting patrons and service providers after Mr. Desmarais arrived in 2013, you agree that 15 this statement is at least incomplete because at 16 17 this time BCLC was still taking steps to minimize upsetting VIP patrons even when they 18 19 had known associations to cash facilitators who 20 were associated to Paul Jin, who was known to be 21 associated with organized crime; correct? Well, I would say that, again, in this instance, 22 А 23 if you look at the timeline in this, we were in 24 the process of almost building out and 25 completing our sourced-cash conditions program.

We were still in that same period that we were talking about earlier, so it's essentially the same scenario that we were talking about earlier, in that we wanted the service provider to be able to deal with it in the first instance and effectively manage it and then we would move in.

The two different functions, one of these 8 9 incidents, I believe, happens at Villa and 10 involves Brandon and Randy Sears, and that was kind of a one off for them because he doesn't 11 12 often play at Villa, so for him to show up over 13 there, it presents kind of whole new challenges 14 for obviously the Villa staff. Then he's gone back to River Rock, and now we've got the same 15 sensitivities and issues that we were talking 16 17 about before at River Rock.

18 So we wanted to give them an opportunity. 19 And we see he's again not complying, but he's 20 moved back to River Rock. So number one, he 21 can't change casinos to avoid detection; and 22 number two, the action is coming very, very 23 quickly if he doesn't correct his behaviour. 24 And he got sourced-cash conditions within, I 25 think, two weeks of this happening, this initial

1 request to River Rock to go in and deal with it. 2 So, again, I'm going back to the same --3 the same thoughts that I expressed earlier in 4 that we were working our best for these -- for 5 patrons like this to try and work with 6 management and have that relationship to deal 7 with the problem effectively and return him to proper playing his PGF, which ultimately we did. 8 9 However, it was not something that we gave a lot 10 of leeway to in terms of we had -- they had a 11 chance to get in and take action; if they weren't able to do it, then we stepped up and we 12 took over and effectively put them on 13 sourced-cash conditions. 14

15 That was a huge, huge play at that point in 16 time. And if you look at the grand scheme of 17 things of where we were trying to build to, that 18 was a major, major victory for us to be able to 19 go through and put Jia Gao on sourced-cash 20 conditions.

21 Q Okay. I'm at page 645. And near the bottom of 22 this page on April 13th you say that Mr. Gao --23 so:

24 "Jia Gao file from last night, we should25 chat later today about Jia Gao's buy-in

after he lost his cash at the [River Rock] 1 2 tables. On a positive note --" The positive note is redacted. 3 4 "On a negative note he had 500K in 5 un-sourced cello-wrapped 5K chips delivered by Qi Li ... who, according to 6 7 our records, is a dealer at the Edgewater 8 Casino. This will be interesting!" 9 And you agree that this volume of unsourced 10 cello-wrapped \$5,000 chips is suspicious; 11 correct? 12 Absolutely. Α And did you have suspicion about this Edgewater 13 Q dealer? 14 We had -- I'm going by memory right now. I 15 А believe we had an inquiry about him at one point 16 17 in time, but I don't know how much intelligence we had on him at that point in time to be able 18 19 to speak to it at this point about his 20 involvement in cash deliveries or chip 21 deliveries or anything like that. Because the suspicion with this volume of 22 Q unsourced cello-wrapped \$5,000 chips is that 23 it's cash facilitation; correct? 24 25 Yep, absolutely. А

1	Q	And would that have been reported to GPEB?
2	А	Oh, absolutely.
3	Q	The involvement of the Edgewater dealer?
4	A	Yeah no, this entire file would have been
5		flagged for UFT by us, it would have an 86 to
6		GPEB, and we would have had discussions probably
7		with GPEB on this because with that amount of
8		5 K chips at play, we were also dealing with
9		concerns that Paul Jin not only had cash that he
10		was using, but he had chips that he was using as
11		a commodity to lend out back and forth,
12		basically to make the player anonymous going in
13		and out of the casinos. And we were starting to
14		see a huge incline in 5 K chips being missing
15		from stock, basically. Not accounted for.
16		So where we normally would see a fluctuation

of 1.5 to 2 million overall of 5 K chips, all of 17 18 that sudden that number started to ramp up and 19 now literally within a year we're looking at 7 20 to \$8 million worth of River Rock chips are out 21 there with patrons, supposedly. So it was very 22 concerning to us, because that presents a number 23 of problems and challenges for us. So this kind 24 of incident would have been absolutely 25 investigated fully and --

1	Q	Would this
2	A	Followed up by GPEB.
3	Q	To the best of your recollection was Mr. Li
4		subject to any disciplinary or regulatory action
5		as a result of this?
6	A	I don't have any information. We report the
7		information, give it to GPEB and they conduct
8		their investigation. We don't normally get
9		reports back responsive reports back of
10		results.
11	Q	Okay.
12	A	Yeah, it's hard to say.
13	Q	I'm on page 646. And this is where you've been
14		leading to at the top here. It's April 14th,
15		2015. Bruno writes:
16		"As a result of recent activity by
17		[Mr.] Gao the following sanctions are
18		imposed on him:
19		1. No play/chip-in with un-sourced chips.
20		2. No play/buy-in with un-sourced cash."
21		Correct?
22	A	Yep.
23	Q	And then halfway down the page, a question is
24		raised about what happens with the chips Mr. Gao
25		has access to. It's 1.5 million in chips on him

and 1 million in the abandoned chip account. 1 2 Α Yep. And what's the abandoned chip account? 3 Q The abandoned chip account is something we ran 4 А into quite often with these players at the high 5 6 level. And it's essentially -- I want to call them -- where they've walked away from the 7 table. They've got -- they could be playing for 8 9 hours into the night and at 1 o'clock in the 10 morning they've got three quarters of a million 11 dollars in chips sitting at the table, and they 12 decide, I'm done; I don't want to play anymore. 13 They just say, I'm going to come back tomorrow, 14 and they literally walk away from the table.

15 They don't count them; they don't secure them; they don't do anything with the chips. 16 17 They just walk away. And then generally the service provider will keep some of these there 18 19 for a bit in case he comes back, and then when 20 they realized he's not coming back from sure, 21 they will then process it -- as per policy have 22 security move it to the vault, and they process it into a holding account. And then when he 23 24 comes back in the next day, he will come in to 25 the cage and say, I left my chips here; I want

them back, and they bring them back out to the table and he continues to the play. So it's an abandoned chip file is what we refer to it, and it's -- for quite some time we had a lot of that happening.

6 The chip issue -- on that side, the missing chip issue, when we're either -- referring to 7 1.5 million in chips, that's what he advised us. 8 9 When we put him on sourced-cash conditions, we 10 explained to him at the time that that 11 includes -- the chip conditions include you 12 cannot bring in chips unless we can source it. 13 So it takes away the ability, rather than cash, 14 to use Jin's chips and come in and play the 15 casino even though you're either banned or sanctioned. So they would have to be able to go 16 17 back and show that you had taken the chips out at one point in time. 18

When we found out he had 1.5 million, that was a concern and it caused us to have a do a lot of background and work with River Rock, and that's where it's referencing Rishi. We have to be able to ensure they can account for 1.5 million chips where he has walked away with them. So he has -- a partial chunk of these

chips are he's walked away from the table and 1 2 left it in the casino. The other is chips supposedly he's left with, and he did do that 3 4 routinely. So we had to be able to confirm that, otherwise it was going to be problematic 5 6 in allowing him to bring that back. 7 So being on chip -- sourced-cash conditions, you're allowed to use cash if you can source it, 8 9 and you're allowed to use chips if you can 10 source it. But without that he would have been 11 unable to do that, so that was the issue there. 12 At the bottom of the page and over to the next Q 13 page it says that Mr. Gao --"It's been determined by [River Rock] that 14 Mr. Gao has 1.4 million in winnings that 15 16 he may still be in possession of in chips, 17 in addition to the 1 million that he is currently playing with." 18 19 And they ask that he be contacted to advise him 20 that if he still has the 1.4 million in chips, 21 he's to bring them back, and a deadline is set and that those will be processed; correct? 22 23 А That's correct, yes. 24 And then after these conditions were imposed, Q 25 Mr. Gao continued to play contrary to the

1		conditions that were imposed on him; correct?
2	A	Again, in order to be accurate I would have to
3		be able to look at his track record and his
4		table record to see when that may have occurred
5		and when it didn't occur. I know he came in
6		he came back in a number of times after he had
7		the sourced-cash conditions on, and I don't know
8		if those are incidents where he was not paying
9		attention and or not providing the proper
10		receipting or they weren't able to provide the
11		proper tracking.
1.0	0	

12 Q Well, if we look --

- 13AI do know he went back and subsequently started14using his PGF account after this, which required15then bank drafts.
- So if we look at the entry for April 24th at the 16 Q 17 bottom of this page, "Update From Ross Alderson," and he sets out that certain 18 19 conditions were imposed on Mr. Gao, and he sets 20 out what those are. And then in the third 21 paragraph from the bottom, it says: 22 "There has been recent continued activity 23 by Mr. Gao contrary to these conditions, 24 BCLC asks that the following reiteration

and clarification of these conditions be

_	Tottenha by Ms. La		51
1		immediately communicated to all BC Casino	
2		front line staff who have direct contact	
3		with Mr. Gao."	
4		Correct?	
5	Q	And the first condition relates to the unsourced	f
б		cash and chips; right?	
7	A	Yes.	
8	Q	And then if you go over the page, it's	
9		there's a second condition under the heading	
10		"Bank Drafts," and that requires that those come	0
11		from an accredited financial institution and	
12		that Mr. Gao be able to show it is from his own	
13		bank account and payable to the casino and that	
14		he may not deposit basically third-party ban	٢
15		drafts; correct?	
16	A	That's correct, yes.	
17	Q	And was the concern here that the bank drafts	
18		that Mr. Gao might access might also be from	
19		cash facilitators?	
20	A	No. No, we just we wanted to ensure this was	3
21		covered off in every which way that when he came	0
22		back in, he was using tracked chips, sourced	
23		cash, and if he was using the his bank draft	,
24		because we're obviously we know we're going	
25		to be dealing in fairly large numbers that we	

wanted to make sure that he was using it from
 his account.

3 We had all our information -- a lot of 4 information in terms of his source of wealth, so 5 we were very comfortable in terms of his source of wealth and his ability to play at this level. б 7 So that wasn't at issue. And we were also aware 8 that he had multiple accounts at that time. So 9 we knew he had the ability to use his PGF 10 account with bank drafts.

Q Okay. So you weren't worried that bank drafts were able to be used from some institutions in an anonymized way?

14 A No.

Q They might be, you know, by a third party on hisbehalf?

17 No. We weren't worried -- we weren't concerned Α that was going to be an outcome. We don't allow 18 19 third-party transactions at BCLC. However, we 20 have a very strict monitoring program, a regimen 21 built up over bank drafts and how we monitor 22 them day to day and monthly and their usage, so 23 I'm -- I was confident that we were okay in that 24 regard. So there was no concern that he was 25 going to start trying to do cash facilitating

through the use of a bank draft into a PGF 1 2 account and that was going to become the next 3 issue. That wasn't part of it. At the bottom of page 648 is an email from 4 Q 5 Mr. Beeksma and the subject is "Gao latest." б And if you go over the page, Mr. Beeksma reports that Mr. Gao -- and I'm sort of in the --7 starting on the second line, he says: 8 9 "Yesterday I received a phone call from 10 Peter Demonte, (surveillance manager) 11 advising that Gao came to [River Rock] and redeemed 200+ in chips (un-sourced). He 12 took the cash and left the site. He 13 returned later with a band [sic] draft in 14 15 what I understand to be the same amount. The transaction was completed and Gao 16 17 gambled with no further irregularities known at this time." 18 19 And I've read that correctly; right? 20 Α Yep. 21 And then if you skip down to the -- not the next Q 22 paragraph but the one after that. It begins 23 "Peter called again today." Or -- well, he 24 says -- I guess in the next paragraph he says: 25 "Peter called to give me a heads up as

1 clearly Gao has found a work around. I 2 told him it's OK for now as the buy in 3 money was from a draft as directed and 4 we'd make further inquiries on Monday." 5 And then the next paragraph: "Peter called again to advise he attempted б 7 the same thing today with \$300K in 8 un-sourced chips. This time [River Rock] made the decision to not allow the 9 10 transaction as they feel that he is 11 circumventing the sanctions we imposed. It's --" 12 Well, he says "beloved" but I think he means 13 it's believed. 14 15 "... he's taking the disbursed cash from the casino, depositing it into his bank 16 17 and then taking out a draft to gamble with. Peter does not believe these chips 18 19 are from past winnings." 20 And so at this time you'll agree that it 21 appeared that Mr. Gao was able to circumvent the 22 conditions that were imposed on him and continue 23 to cash in unsourced chips, convert them to a 24 bank draft and continue playing with essentially 25 unsourced funds; correct?

1 I would say the -- from what I'm reading here, А 2 you could look at that that that's a possible 3 scenario that could be happening. In order to 4 cash in chips -- I just -- guess I'm just trying 5 to find the path here. If you're bringing in -if he's bringing in chips and cashing them and 6 7 taking the cash, the only way that those chips should have been accepted is if they were 8 9 properly tracked. And if we knew that he was 10 good for 1.5 million, one would think that we 11 would've been able to keep track of that, those chips going back in, and they would know whether 12 or not they're sourced or unsourced. 13

14 If they were not properly sourced, they shouldn't be -- they wouldn't be accepting or 15 16 shouldn't have been accepting them. But if he 17 was cashing the chips in to get cash and then take the cash to the bank to get a bank draft, I 18 19 quess from our perspective I'm looking at this 20 as the due diligence is going to be on the 21 inbound funds at the bank, at BFI, they're going to know where the cash came from. 22 23 Q You have due diligence about the chips, though;

24 correct?

25 A We've got -- the service provider and we have

1 the due diligence on the chips. So they 2 shouldn't have been -- and I don't know, it's hard to read because we're talking -- on one 3 4 article here they're talking about 1.5 million, 5 they're saying he has. And then another paragraph it said, we actually think he's got б 7 about 1.1 million, and then we're hearing bits and pieces where he's bringing in 200,000 in 8 9 chips. So I don't know if it's part of that 10 1.5 million they're referring to. That is why I 11 don't want to speculate on that part of it. 12 When you --Q 13 А If it's --MR. STEPHENS: I think he was just finishing his 14 answer, Ms. Latimer. 15 THE WITNESS: If he's already -- if he has not turned 16 17 in that 1.5 or that 1.1 million, and I think that was the problem -- part of the problem with 18 19 Jia Gao, if my -- and I'm going by memory right 20 now. If we were asking him to bring all the 21 chips in so that we could basically liquidate them and say okay, we're done; we know where you 22 23 stand; you're at ground zero from hereon in, but 24 I don't think that's what was done. I think 25 they were trying to make -- they were trying to

1 ascertain how many chips were actually outstanding that could be tracked by River Rock. 2 3 And if we agreed and that was that 4 1.1 million or the 1.5 million, then he wouldn't necessarily have to bring them back in. It 5 would just mean that he could use them properly. 6 7 Because he's on sourced-cash conditions. That means he can come in with chips and play with 8 9 chips as long as they're sourced. It doesn't 10 prohibit him playing with chips. So there's no 11 real value to him if he is -- if they're tracked and sourced for him to come in and try and cash 12 the chips out, take the cash, buy a bank draft 13 and then come back with a bank draft to buy into 14 his PGF to play. I mean, that does not make 15 logical sense that he would want to do that or 16 17 try to do that and that that's a workaround because he's already got the chips in his hand. 18

And the only way -- the only way, if they're sourced through River Rock, and they're saying they are, the only way he could play with those is if they're sourced; otherwise they're of no value to him. So if he can't cash them out to get the cash, that's what I'm trying to wrap my brain around of what you're asking here.

1	Q	Well, sir, you see in the email on page 649 that
2		I took you to already where it says:
3		"Peter does not believe these chips are
4		from past winnings."
5		And indeed River Rock was confident enough that
6		they were not from past winnings, that they
7		refused his second attempt to buy in with
8		\$300,000. So you'll agree that it appears that
9		in this instance Mr. Gao is attempting to buy in
10		with unsourced chips; correct?
11	А	Yes. In the on the second paragraph, the
12		first one was the 200,000, and this is 300,000
13		for Peter. Yes, I would agree that's what
14		they're looking at.
15	Q	If you now turn to page 650. You see an entry
16		here April 28th, "Jia Gao Update - Kris Gade":
17		"Hi everyone. If and when Mr. Gao calls
18		Stone back, he can be told that he is
19		allowed to "buy-in" for the remaining
20		\$300K in outstanding [River Rock] chips
21		that he apparently is in possession of.
22		There is no need for him to exchange the
23		chips for cash and then go get a Bank
24		Draft."
25		He says:

1		"He can play straight away with said
2		chips. This is a one (1) time occurrence
3		however, and the site is going to have to
4		accurately said chips to assure this \$300k
5		does not turn into a bottomless ordeal."
6	A	Yes.
7	Q	So you agree that on April 28th a decision was
8		made to allow Mr. Gao to continue to bend the
9		AML rules by buying in with unsourced chips,
10		even though he was on sourced-chip conditions;
11		correct?
12	A	I think you're referring to 28th now, the second
13		part of that?
14	Q	Yes.
15	A	Yes.
16	Q	And if you look at page 659. At the top this is
17		an email sent May 13th, 2015, from Mr. Beeksma,
18		and essentially he sets out that Mr. Gao
19		attempted to buy in at a casino with a bank
20		draft and it was refused because the bank draft
21		was made out to Mr. Gao and not to Great
22		Canadian; correct?
23	A	Yes.
24	Q	And if you turn to page 717.
25	A	Sorry, 717?

2 A Okay.

Here is an October 2nd, 2015 update file on Jia 3 Q 4 Gao -- or Jia Gao, and it's an email from 5 Brandon to Bruno; correct? Do you see that? б Α Yep. 7 Q And here Brandon says he got a call from Villa 8 saying Gao had come in with \$25,000 in unsourced 9 chips, and they denied his play but cashed him 10 out. So, again, do you agree that cashing out 11 \$25,000 in unsourced chips is an example of bending the AML rules for Mr. Gao? 12 I would say if that's what happened in this 13 А 14 instance, it was an error in judgment that was 15 made, absolutely. If they didn't have tracking on his chips, they would absolutely deny his 16 17 play. Back in the day we didn't have -- the rules that we have currently in play which would 18 19 allow for seizure of the chips, but they should 20 not have been cashed out, absolutely.

Q And despite his continued contravention of the
conditions that he had been placed under,
Mr. Gao was not barred from play; correct?
A No, he was not banned at this point.

25 Q If you go to paragraph 83 of your affidavit.

1MR. STEPHENS: Para 83 is I think what Ms. Latimer2referred to. Page 17.

3 THE WITNESS: Okay.

4 MS. LATIMER:

5 Q And you describe here how after he was placed on 6 sourced-cash conditions there was a dip in 7 Mr. Gao's play, but then his buying levels went 8 back up to a comparable level and you say he was 9 depositing bank drafts into his PGF account; 10 correct?

11 A Yes.

12 Q And I'm going to suggest to you that the 13 chronology we just looked at puts into question 14 the legitimacy of the source of funds for at 15 least some of those bank drafts. Do you agree 16 with that?

17 Well, let's break them down into two pieces. А The first one that we're talking about was where 18 he'd buy if in for \$200,000 in chips and was 19 20 allowed because it was sourced and then he had 21 tried to do another 300,000, and it was denied 22 by Peter. And then subsequently the next day he 23 returned and he was allowed to buy in, and that 24 was per Kris Gade, which to me indicates that 25 calls were made to say, what's going on; I've

1 tried to cash my chips in. Kris Gade is the 2 manager in the investigations side. I'm making an assumption here, but I'm sure he would have 3 4 been -- looked into it, would've looked at the 5 tracking, and the fact that they allowed him to cash it in and put it into his account would 6 7 tell me that they weren't confident they could find enough evidence to show that it wasn't his 8 9 chips in their tracking system, which would not 10 surprise me.

11 So from that perspective I think they revisited it and looked at it and couldn't say 12 13 absolutely that it wasn't unsourced, that they 14 were possibly or likely his from his previous -that he had said he had. Therefore they allowed 15 it and then wanted to make sure he had very 16 17 strict conditions in terms of what he was doing moving forward. So from that on I don't -- I 18 19 mean, that's from my perspective what I'm --20 just what I'm reading here.

21 On the other one, if he attempted to cash 22 in and everything that we're seeing in there, 23 that is one incident. What I'm referring to in 24 my affidavit is I did a review in preparation 25 for this, and in that review I went back and I

looked at Jia Gao in totality before I put the
 notes into my affidavit.

3 And in totality from the time that we got 4 him onto sourced-cash conditions to the time he ultimately got banned way down the road, there 5 6 was a very large period of play that I looked 7 at, and I looked at it fairly closely, that showed a slight dip in his play -- and he was 8 9 still playing at a fairly high level, but a 10 slight dip in his play immediately after the 11 sourced-cash conditions. And then I saw 12 activity in his PGF and then an immediate return 13 up to a very high level of play that mirrored 14 fairly close to what he was doing with the cash. 15 And that went on for a period of a year and some time. 16

17 Now, during the course of that there was -so there's a lot of files through there. 18 There's a lot of activity, hundreds of thousands 19 20 to 600,000 transactions, a lot of -- almost all 21 of it was PGF activity and bank drafts in very 22 high volume. So I'm looking at this, saying, 23 from my perspective, he's playing by the rules; 24 he's done what he's supposed to be doing. Now, 25 by virtue of picking out one incident for

\$30,000 somewhere where he's been rejected in
 that one, one year and a half period, I would
 not say that that is supportive of somebody
 who's ignoring.

5 I mean, clearly in every other instance that I've found -- and there was a lot of them -- he б 7 was playing by the rules and doing what he was. So from my perspective we were getting the 8 9 appropriate response. Does that mean that he 10 never made a mistake or tried something goofy 11 when he was chasing at the end of a night of gambling? It's possible. Kesi Wei did the same 12 13 thing. Kesi Wei had multiples, and that's what we had to deal with him. 14

So I don't know that I would classify him the way you've put it to me. I wouldn't say that it was problematic. I would say he had a very lengthy history after that of good behaviour that fell within the rules and very few incidents that I could find where I could see that would indicate otherwise.

22 Q You say his high level of play continued to June 23 2016 when it stopped suddenly, and he didn't 24 return to BCLC casinos; correct?

25 A That's correct.

Q You say you can't confirm the reason for his
 stop in play; correct?

3 A That's correct.

4 But you do open source research on many BCLC Q 5 patrons, and my question is did you see it reported in the media that Mr. Gao had borrowed 6 7 tens of millions of dollars from private lenders and ended up losing all of his British Columbia 8 9 real estate and money to those lenders? I can't say -- off the top of my head I can't 10 А 11 say that I referenced it. I can pretty well say 12 with 99 percent certainty we had that in our 13 file. From my perspective back in the time that 14 we were dealing with him, when he dropped off the radar and all of a sudden stopped playing, 15 the information I was hearing back was that he 16 17 had money problems, serious money issues and that's why his play stopped. 18

And in fact we had one player that told us through interview that he was on the verge of bankruptcy because he had lost so much money in the casinos that it was crippling him and his business. All hearsay, all third party, but it explained the sudden dropoff because to me that was really strange behaviour.

1 As a result of that and then going further 2 on down the road, I know that he -- we did ban 3 him. We banned him based on open-source 4 information, and he had no activity between the 5 time he disappeared and the time we banned him. 6 All of a sudden the ban came on. So I'm going 7 to suggest that that ban that we put on him was probably a result -- it was an AML ban, so it's 8 9 going to be AML D-risk ban, which means he's a 10 risk that we're not prepared to continue and we 11 terminated his relationship. And he didn't have 12 any play prior to that in the time that he 13 disappeared.

14So I'm going to say one works with the other15and makes sense.

Did you hear that those private lenders that he 16 Q 17 lost all his money and property to had been arrested in 2016 and found to have money covered 18 in traces of illicit drugs, including fentanyl? 19 20 Again, I recalled reading the article. I don't Α 21 have further details other than what we saw in 22 the article.

Q It was in April 2015 that you learned that FSOCs
E-Pirate investigation was underway; correct?
A That's correct, yep.

1	Q	And also in that month that Ross Alderson became
2		the Director of AML and investigations; correct?
3	A	That's correct, yes.
4	Q	I'll ask you to turn to exhibit 118, please.
5		And I'm at page 957.
б	А	957?
7	Q	Yes.
8	A	Okay.
9	Q	And you recognize this as an email that has been
10		forwarded to you in March 2018, but the original
11		email was sent May 14th, 2015; correct?
12	А	Yes, I do.
13	Q	And this is an email from Ross Alderson to AML,
14		Kris Gade and Bruno Gatto and the subject is
15		"VVIP players and sanctions"; correct?
16	А	Yes.
17	Q	And Mr. Alderson says:
18		"I have no concerns about requesting
19		further employment clarification and
20		noting it on a player's iTrak profile, nor
21		having the Investigations Management and
22		AML Specialist jointly discussing whether
23		a player should be interviewed, so
24		Investigators can then be provided with
25		that instruction.

1 However, in the absence of any 2 written escalation procedures right now, 3 before we contemplate suspending, barring 4 or putting conditions on any of the VVIP 5 players which may impact revenue ... please bring Kevin and myself into the 6 7 loop in the form of arranging a 8 teleconference or preferably a joint 9 meeting so we can get an overall picture." 10 And he goes on to set out what his understanding 11 of what a VVIP player is. So, first of all, is it fair to say that in 12 13 May 2015 there were ongoing concerns about the 14 appropriate role and procedure for escalating 15 interviews to BCLC investigators in terms of interviewing VIP patrons? 16 17 We were -- during that time we were in a process А where we were coming out with the player 18 19 sanction interviewing process. It included 20 sanctions and interviews. So it was right in 21 that -- in that period because this is May 14th, 2015. 22 23 Q Okay. In the second to last paragraph here

24 Mr. Alderson says:

25 "Ultimately we will have to brief Brad.

1 Being mindful that email is not always the 2 best method of communication in these 3 sensitive matters lest it be 4 misinterpreted." 5 Did you understand that BCLC staff should try to avoid communicating about issues like these over б 7 emails at this time? Well, I would say that's what that is implying 8 А in that sentence. I don't know how else you 9 10 could take it. That is not a practice that's 11 something I'm aware of and it's not something that we do. 12 13 Q Do you understand that concern to stem from 14 information that may be disclosed through freedom of information requests? 15 I think --16 А 17 MR. STEPHENS: I object Mr. Commissioner. Mr. -this is Mr. Alderson's email that the witness is 18 19 being asked about. His evidence was just to the 20 effect that this was not the practice. So --21 and now my friend Ms. Latimer is asking him for 22 the reason for the practice that Mr. Tottenham 23 has just said he doesn't think exists. I 24 respectfully object to that question. 25 THE COMMISSIONER: Ms. Latimer?

MS. LATIMER: Well, he said he took the email in the 1 2 same way that I suggested that it should be 3 taken, and I was asking him if he understood 4 what the point of it was. But I'm happy to move 5 on. 6 THE COMMISSIONER: Thank you. 7 MS. LATIMER: 8 And also in May 2015 you spoke to Glenn Atkins Q 9 of FSOC, and you were advised by FSOC that 10 E-Pirate may not continue to be resourced; 11 correct? 12 Yes, I was contacted by him at that time. Α BCLC was asked to put together a presentation on 13 Q the social and economic impacts of money 14 15 laundering to support that project; correct? 16 Α That's correct, yes. 17 And how did that request make you feel? Q Concerning and frustrated. 18 А 19 0 Why was it frustrating? 20 We had just initiated -- they had initiated Α 21 their project and we were -- E-Pirate, we were 22 advised it was up and running and we were hearing some very, very positive things, as we 23 24 expected. And it was playing out the way we 25 expected it would once we got law enforcement

engaged, which is really good, and they were
 accelerating very quickly.

Then all of a sudden, literally two months 3 4 after this thing is off and running -- and this 5 is something we've been waiting for forever to 6 happen -- we get a phone call that says they're 7 going to pull the funding and the project is going to stop. And it was put to me that we 8 9 have to be able to explain to our bosses why we 10 should be continuing this venture, this project 11 because it's very costly and almost put it to --I mean, one of the quotes was, is it a big deal 12 that there's criminal money running through 13 14 casinos?

15 So we got very, very short notice. It was, like, literally a 24- or 48-hour turnaround to 16 17 get a presentation built, which we did. And we used our analytics people to assist in putting 18 19 it all together. And we did -- it was 12-, 20 13-page PowerPoint that covered all the aspects 21 that they indicated needed to be covered, which 22 is how it impacted the economy to -- you name 23 it, economic sanctions.

24 And we offered to attend and present it as 25 they were told they had to present it to their

senior leadership in two days. I think we got 1 2 the call on Tuesday and by Thursday that was their meeting date. So we had a very short 3 4 turnaround to produce this. They said that we 5 would not be able to attend and be part of the presentation but appreciated that we could do 6 this and put it together and give it to them, 7 which we did. 8

9 It then went to their bosses. They had 10 obviously their meeting on the Thursday and we 11 subsequently learned after the fact that their 12 bosses had made a decision that changed their 13 mind; they're not going to defund it; they're 14 going to put more resources into it and it's 15 going to continue.

So I guess the frustrating part on that is 16 17 that it took us forever to try and get engagement, police engagement to go after Jin's 18 19 group. We finally get there and get two months 20 into it and things are going great, and then all 21 of a sudden we get put on pause. So that was 22 concerning. Obviously the fact that they picked 23 it back up and they realized the value of it and 24 picked it back up and where it obviously took 25 off to after that was good. Very, very

1 positive. But -- yeah. 2 Okay. I'm turning to exhibit 43, please. And 0 3 I'll just say in your affidavit you identified 4 this as a chronology that you prepared, but I'm 5 going to suggest that it appears it was prepared 6 by Mr. Alderson. If you look at page 407. 7 А What page -- sorry, what page are you referring 8 to in there? 9 MR. STEPHENS: I think she's in exhibit 43, tab 43 --10 THE WITNESS: Oh, tab 43. 11 MR. STEPHENS: -- Mr. Tottenham. 12 THE WITNESS: Sorry. I thought you were talking about on the affidavit 43. Okay. 13 MS. LATIMER: 14 If you look at page 407, do you agree that --15 0 16 did you prepare this chronology or was this 17 prepared by Mr. Alderson? Yeah, that was -- this is a document by Ross 18 А 19 Alderson. And I think that shows on page 407. 20 Okay. And so do you know where the information Q 21 in the chronology came from? I do not. Other than I'm looking at the 22 А notations that are in here. A lot of the 23 24 notations are similar pieces to other 25 chronologies that we have had and that we had

done for the AML Unit where we've documented 1 2 certain pieces and done timelines. So I'm 3 seeing some of them are very, very similar. And 4 you'll see -- I think you will see them 5 repeated. It's almost the same wording on other 6 copies. The ones where it's cut and pasted, like on 7 8 this one, page 403, that looks like it was cut 9 and pasted from another report, I'm going to 10 call it. 11 Q Okay. If you turn to page 405 at the top. 12 Α Yep. It indicates that on July 22nd, 2015: 13 Q 14 "BCLC Director met with FSOC Inspector 15 Calvin Chrustie to discuss new information regarding the Jin file." 16 17 Were your present at that meeting? I was not. 18 А 19 0 How did you come to learn of it? 20 The specific date or this information -- this is Α 21 something that -- information that I've gotten 22 and just become familiar with it through the 23 course of preparing for this inquiry. 24 Okay. Q 25 In terms of the actual meeting itself, I was А

aware of the meeting that he had with Calvin 1 2 Chrustie simply by conversations that I had with him after the fact where he indicated he had 3 4 gone and met with him. And I think that's --Did Mr. Alderson share with the AML Unit at the 5 Q time that the investigation had uncovered that 6 7 Jin was likely linked to transnational drug trafficking and suspected to be linked to 8 9 terrorist financing? Yes, he did. 10 А And did he share that Officer Chrustie had 11 0 12 stated that some of the proceeds were directly related to casino activity, and specifically the 13 River Rock? 14 15 А Yes. That's correct. And Alderson was advised that there was a cash 16 Q 17 house code named Silver in Richmond believed to be the illegal bank that was used for criminal 18 19 activity, including drug proceeds, which were 20 used to fund gamblers at the River Rock; 21 correct? 22 That's correct, yes. А 23 Q And this information was reported to 24 Mr. Alderson and he shared it with the AML Unit; 25 right?

1	A	Absolutely.
2	Q	And it was also reported to the GPEB's executive
3		director compliance and to the BCLC executive?
4	А	That's correct, yes.
5	Q	And on July 27th there was a conference call
6		between BCLC, the RCMP and GPEB to further
7		discuss this information; right? Is that
8		correct?
9	A	I'll agree with you, yeah. I
10	Q	Were you on were you the call?
11	A	I'm not sure if I can confirm by that
12		information if I was on that call or not.
13	Q	Is that because you don't remember?
14	A	Yeah. Top of my head, that date and that time I
15		don't remember.
16	Q	Okay. You don't remember what issues were
17		discussed after learning this information?
18	A	I know what issues were discussed and certainly
19		in terms of how it affected us through
20		subsequent conversations with Ross and with Brad
21		in our group, so absolutely I was aware of the
22		content of the information that he got from FSOC
23		in that meeting and potentially what it meant
24		and potentially what we were going to do with it
25		and respond to it.

1		I just can't say a hundred percent that I
2		was on that phone call. It may have been a
3		Director- or VP-level phone call that we were
4		not involved with.
5	Q	Okay.
6	A	I'm not able to say otherwise.
7	Q	One thing that happened in response to that
8		information was that 10 players believed to have
9		recently received cash from Jin were placed on
10		conditions; correct?
11	A	That's correct, yes.
12	Q	And I take it is that the list that's
13		appended at exhibit 45?
14	А	That's correct.
15	Q	And exhibit 45, this is an email from Ross
16		Alderson, and you're copied on this email. And
17		the list of recipients for this email is long,
18		but if you look at it I'm at page 418.
19	А	Үер.
20	Q	You agree that it includes individuals at
21		Gateway Casinos; correct?
22	А	Yes.
23	Q	And also Great Canadian Gaming; correct?
24	А	Yes.
25	Q	And Paragon?

Yes.

1 Α Yes.

2 0 And then also some specific casinos, including 3 Starlight, the River Rock and Edgewater; 4 correct?

Α

5

6 THE COMMISSIONER: I'm sorry. I'm going to interrupt for a moment, if I may, Ms. Latimer. What --7 where are you looking at? I'm not sure --8 9 MS. LATIMER: I'm at exhibit 45, and it's page 418. 10 THE COMMISSIONER: Okay. All right. Thank you.

11 MS. LATIMER:

12 And I'm just at the top. And, Mr. Tottenham, I Q 13 had asked you about the service providers who 14 were copied, which you confirmed. And I'm now 15 asking you that as well it appears that there are individuals from specific casinos copied, 16 17 and those casinos include the Starlight, the River Rock and the Edgewater. Do you agree? 18 19 А Yes, that's correct. This is a group mail that 20 we often use that has key people within key 21 organizations from the service provider, so we 22 have multiple people that are listed that show 23 up from River Rock, from Parq, from Edgewater. 24 So there are -- when we want to send a message 25 out all the -- kind of the top executive, this

1 is what we do, and send it out to ensure it gets 2 spread across and not just one delegate at River 3 Rock. 4 Q This email, was it sent to this collection of service providers and casinos because these are 5 the locations that these 10 patrons attended? 6 7 А Yes, pretty much. I mean, obviously the 8 majority with River Rock, but we've had 9 incidents that we've seen kind of from all the 10 sites, so there was no site that wasn't kind of 11 touched by this. 12 From these three sites anyway; correct? Q 13 Α Yep.

14 Q Okay. And the conditions are set out in the 15 email, and those included a prohibition on those 16 players buying in with unsourced chips or cash; 17 correct?

18 A That's correct, yes.

19QAnd also a requirement that any bank drafts20deposited into the PGF account be from an21accredited financial institution; correct?

22 A That's correct, yes.

Q And that the player be able to show that the
bank draft is derived from their own bank
account and made payable to the casino; right?

1 Α Correct. Were those conditions placed on the use of bank 2 0 3 drafts? Did that stem from an understanding 4 that bank drafts might be vulnerable to abuse by Mr. Jin and his associates? 5 6 А I can't tell you. I wasn't the author of the 7 document, so I can't -- it's hard to say what the context was that he put that specific piece 8 9 in there. Was that a topic of discussion, that bank drafts 10 Q 11 might be vulnerable by abuse by Mr. Jin and his associates? 12 We've had actually quite a lot of conversation, 13 А not only in this area, but obviously it ties 14 15 into other things, including Project Athena, into the relevance of having a bank draft made 16 17 out to the player or to the casino and the impact. We've had those -- a lot of discussions 18 19 around that because from our perspective, having 20 it made out to the player means that if he's 21 taking it out and he's having a bank draft made 22 out to himself and then comes in and cashing it 23 in, he is the only person that can use that bank 24 account and that -- or sorry, that bank cheque. 25 So if he shows up at Gateway with a cheque

1 from him as the sender and the payee is himself, 2 he is the only person that's going to be -- we 3 don't allow third-party transactions, so he's 4 the only person that can transact that at the 5 casino. If it's made out payable to the casino, the holder of it is payable, and therefore it 6 7 falls back on who the sender is to determine ownership of funds and third-party liability, 8 9 which to me makes it more easily abused within 10 the environment of the casino. 11 So we've had many of those discussions, and 12 we've had some players that we've actually put specific conditions on in terms of bank drafts, 13 14 but by and large it's bank drafts from your own 15 account is the normal wording that we use. Okay. And the list of casino patrons is found 16 Q 17 at page 419.1, and one of these patrons in about the middle of the list is Mr. Guo Tai Shi; 18 19 correct? 20 Which page are we referring to, sorry? Α 21 419.1. And the -- about the one, two, three, Q four, five -- sixth line down. 22 23 Α Yes. Guo Tai Shi. 24 And that is the same patron that we had earlier Q 25 discussed who was observed on October 25th,

1		2012, receiving a large bag of cash from Mr. Jin
2		at the Starlight containing the 150,000 in 20s,
3		50s and 100s; correct?
4	A	That's correct, yes.
5	Q	Was this the first instance when Mr. Shi is
6	×	having conditions imposed against him?
	7	
7	A	Yes, it is, I believe.
8	Q	And if we return to exhibit 5, please.
9	A	Okay.
10	Q	And at page 49. I'm going to suggest to you
11		that most of the names on this list of
12		10 players that are believed to have recently
13		received cash from Mr. Jin are also found on
14		this list of incidents from 2012, 2013 and 2014
15		and '15. Do you agree with that?
16	A	Yes, I would agree generally that that is what
17		the appearance, yes.
18	Q	And
19	A	Hard to say, exactly.
20	Q	Okay. And I'm
21	A	[Indiscernible.]
22	Q	I'm looking at exhibit 41.
23	MS.	LATIMER: Mr. Commissioner, I see that I see
24		that I'm out of time for the day.
25	THE	COMMISSIONER: Do you want to carry on a bit or

1 are you -- would you prefer to adjourn now? 2 MS. LATIMER: I'm happy to carry on, if it's comfortable for others. 3 4 THE COMMISSIONER: I think I should sort of put it 5 out there. Does anyone -- is anyone facing a difficulty if we carry on for another 15 to 6 20 minutes, something like that? 7 THE WITNESS: There's not, Mr. Commissioner. 8 I'm 9 fine with whatever is required. 10 THE COMMISSIONER: Thank you, Mr. Tottenham. 11 All right. If you can carry on for a bit, Ms. Latimer. I'm not sure of our time 12 constraints hereafter, but we'll carry on for a 13 14 bit at this point. MS. LATIMER: 15 I'm turning to exhibit 41. 16 Q 17 Α Okay. Mr. Tottenham, this is a draft chronology 18 0 19 detailing BCLC's interactions with FSOC; is that 20 correct? 21 That is correct, yes. Α And at the bottom of page 394 it's set out that 22 Q 23 in August 2015 BCLC had planned to do a chip 24 swap at the River Rock because of a large amount 25 of \$5,000 chips that were out of the system.

1		And we talked we talked about that already;
2		correct?
3	A	Yes, that's correct.
4	Q	And the belief at that time was that that was
5		related to Mr. Jin's operation; correct?
6	A	That's correct, yes.
7	Q	At the second line on the next page, it says:
8		"The swap was set to happen on Sept 8th,
9		2015 however, the day prior to the
10		swap-out, BCLC was contacted by FSOC and
11		asked to suspend the operation due to
12		concerns it may inhibit a police
13		investigation."
14		Was that did you participate in that phone
15		call?
16	А	I did not. But I'm aware of it.
17	Q	You're aware of it. And the police
18		investigation that was thought it might be
19		inhibited was E-Pirate; correct?
20	А	I believe so, yes. That was my understanding.
21	Q	Okay. And then at paragraph 87 of your
22		affidavit. This is on page 18.
23	A	Okay.
24	Q	You say that from July to September the AML Unit
25		received names of individuals from FSOC that

1		were apparently known to be receiving cash from
2		Mr. Jin; is that correct?
3	A	That's correct.
4	Q	And I apologize for jumping around a bit, but
5		now if you turn to exhibit 8.
6	A	Yes.
7	Q	This is an email from Mr. Alderson, and it's
8		copying you and others, and it's dated
9		September 11th; correct?
10	A	That is correct, yes.
11	Q	And it says:
12		"BCLC Request For Assistance - Casino
13		Patrons Resent."
14		And the email is to a large number of recipients
15		but you agree that in general it's that same
16		group of recipients that I've already described
17		which is Starlight, River Rock, Edgewater,
18		Gateway, Great Canadian and Paragon; correct?
19	A	That's correct, yes. It appears to be.
20	Q	And, again, this email is sent to that
21		collection of recipients because those are the
22		locations that the players in question frequent;
23		is that correct?
24	A	Yes. I would say it's to cover the bases of all
25		the major casinos that are impacted by what

1 the action we're taking. So essentially making 2 the sure we cover off -- even if Hard Rock only 3 ever received one cash delivery over -- spread 4 over three years, because they didn't have that 5 kind of activity problem there, we still sent 6 them copies of all the stuff that -- when we're 7 taking action.

8 So we're trying to -- it's not to say there 9 was huge problems in every site that's listed 10 here, but it's -- it is indicative of the people 11 that we thought should be in the loop for the 12 companies, and then they can disseminate down to 13 their smaller sites accordingly, but it was the 14 main targets that we were looking at.

Q Okay. And if you look near the middle of the page, this is the email that is apparently being resent. And Mr. Alderson says:

18 "Please find attached a letter regarding
19 conditions to be placed on a small number
20 of Casino Players. Also attached is a
21 list of players involved."

22 And the letter outlines the conditions and the 23 rationale. And he says:

24 "I appreciate this may have a significant25 impact to your business and is not a

1 decision made lightly." 2 And then apologizing for not being able to convey the news in person, but wanting to ensure 3 4 that everybody gets it at the same time. 5 And Mr. Alderson says the conditions on a small number of casino players "may have a 6 significant impact on your business." Is that 7 because the list of players here, though small, 8 9 is a list of VIP players who play at a high 10 level? 11 А Yes. 12 And is the ongoing concern that AML measures may Q impact revenue one that is still held by service 13 providers at this time? 14 15 А Sorry, could you repeat that question. I just want to make sure I have it phrased right. 16 17 Do you understand at this time that service Q providers were concerned that anti-money 18 19 laundering measures might impact their revenue? 20 Again this is a document that was drafted by Α 21 Ross, and what I think he was trying to convey, 22 and certainly from -- again, what I would agree 23 with is that what we were about to do by putting 24 these players on sourced-cash condition was a 25 watershed moment. It was huge. It was going to

have a huge impact across the industry, and it
 led to a number of other similar style source of
 funds moments.

4 So I think they wanted -- and that's why he 5 refers to this. He wanted to -- he would rather do this by phone, in person, because this is the 6 7 kind of thing if you were doing a one-on-one with a casino service provider on any player 8 9 that it only impacts theirs. But this was going 10 to have such a dynamic impact across the board that he wanted to send it out at the same time 11 12 so they all got it at the same time and could digest it because this was, like I said, the 13 14 start, a huge switch point here.

So I don't know if that answers your question.

17QI think so. And I wanted to ask you about that18because you say in your affidavit that the move19to impose sourced-cash conditions affected all20casinos across the province, and I was going to21suggest to you that it must have had the22greatest impact on casinos in the Lower23Mainland; is that correct?

24AYes, absolutely. And that was -- our main focus25was the Lower Mainland, as we call them the big

1 five. And in fact Hard Rock, it's almost hard 2 to put them in the same category because they didn't have this kind of problem, but they had 3 4 some. Right. In fact Hard Rock isn't copied on this 5 Q б communication. It's only Starlight, River Rock 7 and Edgewater. Isn't that right? Yeah, but they are copied by way of Great 8 А 9 Canadian. They're owned by Great Canadian. So 10 we don't have to send out to every single 11 casino. Ownership would look after, you know, downstreaming it to their individual locations. 12 13 Right. But you --Q 14 To Gateway. А 15 Q But it was copied to both Gateway and Starlight, for example, even though they're both Gateway? 16 17 Yep. And it's just depends on the person that Α they're -- I think they're probably sending it 18 19 to because if we have somebody that's working at 20 Gateway head office or somebody that's working 21 specifically at Starlight that has a significant 22 role, they would send it to that person. So it's -- there isn't -- in this -- there's 23

24nothing in here that's specific to people; it's25just to get the message out to as many of the

important people, hey, there's a train coming, and this is it; you need to step up and take notice and we want to let you know as soon as possible. That's kind of what this is conveying right here.

What was the reaction of service providers when 6 Q the source of cash conditions were imposed? 7 I'm going to say for most of them they were 8 А 9 involved in most of this process up to this 10 point. You know, by the time this was happening 11 we're into summer of 2015, and we're peaking at the volumes in STRs. I think a lot of the 12 people that were in the knew -- in the know knew 13 14 this was coming. We had given them enough warning that this is where we're leading to and 15 building to, and they knew all the programs that 16 17 we have been building up to that point. Some of them we had already started putting out. 18

19 So I think there was an anticipation that 20 this was happening. We got a lot of cooperation 21 through this period, so clearly this was a 22 different environment than if we had to try to 23 do something like this, say, back in 2012, but 24 it was -- it impacted the companies and they 25 knew that there was going to be an impact felt

1

when we did this.

2 And we had those discussions with them after 3 the fact and tried to work with them and work with providing cash-alternative programs and 4 development of cash-alternative programs, so not 5 6 just to restrict them from using cash but to 7 give them something else to go to that they could utilize. So, I mean, that was all part of 8 9 the plan.

10 But -- and overall, yes, it was a bit of a 11 shock wave going through because this was 12 followed -- this group of 10 was followed by 13 another 35 literally a month later and by the 14 end of that fiscal, which was only, you know, 15 four months, three months -- four months away, 16 that list was pushing triple digits. So I mean, 17 it's -- it was significant. And they're all big 18 players. They're not ...

19 Q Did it have -- did it have a negative effect on 20 the volume of cash in casinos? By that I mean 21 did the volume of cash decrease?

A Oh, absolutely. Yes. And that was part of our job in the AML. We had analytics. We did a ton of analytics to see what it was doing to -overall to the level play, where -- if the play 1 shifted, if movement shifted to other casinos, 2 other levels of play, were they trying to block 3 down and buy in at lower levels because that was 4 obviously a concern of ours. 5 Q Did it have a negative effect on revenue for the 6 casinos?

7 A It had -- did it have negative impact on revenue
8 for BCLC?

9 Q For the casinos.

Yes, absolutely, I would think so. I know 10 А 11 they -- we heard over time, we got numerous reports in terms of what their losses were as a 12 13 result of that. I know at one point I was told in one year BCLC lost 55 million in the first 14 year as a result of this activity. And yeah, it 15 was -- we knew that was going to happen. It was 16 17 part of the plan. There was nothing you could do about it. We were going in to deal with 18 19 this, and as a result of it building, obviously 20 the more people that go on sourced-cash 21 conditions, the higher -- the harder that impact 22 is going to be.

And we very quickly got into triple-digit players on sourced-cash conditions and to the point -- like, current day we're 642. And

1		that's not just random; that's all high players.
2		That's all significant players to the top. So
3		that's an impact.
4	Q	Okay. I'm at exhibit 9. This is an email from
5		Tom Caverly copying you, and it's dated
6		September 15th, 2015, and the subject is
7		"Priority One Interview Project"; correct?
8	A	Yes.
9	Q	And if you turn to page 74, what this describes
10		is the operational plan for priority 1
11		interviews; is that right?
12	A	Yes.
13	Q	And what it sets out here is that a review STRs
14		filed between June 1 and July 23rd, 2015, found
15		that:
16		"- 162 (67%) of the STRs originated at
17		the River Rock Casino
18		- 145 mention "vehicle" in the narrative
19		and were reviewed to determine if a
20		vehicle delivered cash or if Paul King
21		Jin was involved.
22		- 41 of the 145 (28%) of the STRs from
23		[River Rock] had cash deliveries
24		(nearly $$7M$) and 13 out of the 145
25		(95) mention some association to Paul

Daryl Tot Exam by N		m (for the commission) timer	194
1		King Jin."	
2		Is that correct?	
3	А	Yes. I mean, I didn't do the calculations, bu	ıt
4		I'm confident that those numbers are pretty	
5		accurate and they reflect numbers that we've	
б		used in other reports with the similar reasons	5
7		and numbers.	
8	Q	Okay. And it goes on to say that:	
9		"As a result of the information noted	
10		above coupled with recent intelligence we	5
11		have received from authorities"	
12		And I take it is that the information we've	5
13		discussed that was received by FSOC?	
14	A	That's correct, yes.	
15	Q	It goes on to say:	
16		"We [request] that Investigators	
17		conduct interviews with 36 players with	
18		the intention to obtain information	
19		surrounding the origin of the funds as	
20		well as educate the players as per BCLC	
21		Patron Education Protocol - April 16,	
22		2015."	
23		Correct?	
24	A	That's correct, yes.	
25	Q	What is that education protocol?	

A I think this kind of crosses over to what we were discussing before where we've now taken the people that we've got directly tied to Paul Jin and we're taking an immediate action on them because we've got that information.

6 Now we've got a second subset of the people 7 that we suspect are tied to sourcing their cash through Paul Jin's organization. We may not 8 9 have direct linkage to them, but we have strong 10 connections to them. So we targeted that group 11 of people to basically say, you're next. And we flip it back to the service provider to say, 12 here's a whole bunch of people we want to 13 14 interview, you need to interview, and we're 15 going to accelerate up through because we have reason to believe that they may or may not -- we 16 17 may not be able to prove it absolutely. But as we come through, if we determine that there is 18 19 any links, that they're going to be on 20 sourced-cash conditions at all -- as well.

21 So it was basically the shot across the bow, 22 basically. Here's all the players; have a 23 discussion with them as a priority 1; we're 24 allowing you to talk to your customers and do 25 that work in the front end. If they failed to

1 respond to that and we see the continued action, 2 then we are going to take it up the next level, which is we do the interviews, we put them on 3 4 sourced-cash conditions and/or a ban. 5 So that's effectively what we did, and then we worked through that phase of the source list, 6 7 which ramped it up again pretty fast. Okay. 8 Q 9 Α We did put a deadline on it, I believe, at the 10 time. 11 Q Okay. If you look at the scope of the investigation, it's limited to players known to 12 13 have had cash dropoffs linked to Paul King Jin, 14 and that was the priority 1; correct? 15 Α Yep. And in April 2016 you were promoted to Manager 16 Q 17 of AML Programs; is that right? 18 I was, yes. А And what was the difference in that new role? 19 0 20 It wasn't -- I don't think it changed anything. Α 21 Essentially I was taking over John Karlovcec's John was retiring. I took over the 22 job. 23 AML Unit. Was able to, again, grow the unit, 24 and we started to get more -- obviously we were 25 getting more resources and we were getting a big

commitment from BCLC for funding needs. We 1 2 started increasing the staff for the unit, and we increased the staff on the analytics side. 3 4 And as Bal Bamra came on board in -- I think it 5 was May of 2015, she had joined into the AML unit. We basically formed this into one unit 6 with the programs side and analytics side, and 7 8 then started building that out. And then that 9 was, again, building steps, building blocks. 10 So my actual job function I don't think 11 probably changed a lot when I got promoted in that we were still actively doing all the things 12 13 we were doing, but it was now just the ability 14 to grow our programs and grow the unit. Okay. It was in 2016 that the AML Unit 15 0 implemented a process to require service 16 17 provider surveillance staff to review video

18 surveillance prior to the acceptance of 19 suspicious cash buy-ins in small denominations; 20 correct?

21 A Correct, yes.

22 Q Why did that not happened until 2016 given that 23 BCLC had been alerted that, for example, Mr. Jin 24 was under investigation for money laundering in 25 2012 and FSOC's investigation in 2015?

1AI'm going to say probably the biggest part of2that was it's very difficult and it's a lot of3work, especially with a place the size of River4Rock, to be able to live monitor that size of a5casino and the activity. To be able to go back6and do reviews with as busy as they are is --7it's a huge task.

8 When we were looking at the activities that 9 were coming in prior to targeting or getting the 10 information on Jin that confirmed his 11 criminality side through FSOC, everything that we were working on up until then was based on 12 13 assumptions and suspicious activity. We hadn't 14 at that point been able to confirm that at any 15 level other than through law enforcement.

16 So once that happened and we kind of rolled 17 into the end of 2015 and early '16, we were taking -- we were trying to build out obviously 18 19 more programs and more things that we were doing 20 with the players in terms of how we could look 21 at them and how we could monitor the activities 22 of Paul Jin's group. And this was one of the things that I think, as we were building 23 24 acceptance with the service providers' full 25 cooperation, which we were getting, that this

was a prime opportunity for us to now that we're
going after the players and were placing banned
conditions, we need to be able to enforce that.
And the only way to do that was to start looking
at the cash delivery side and where this cash is
still coming in.

So we came up with a plan, and at the 7 beginning it was just here's an idea, we threw 8 9 it out and see if it sticks. It did. We put it 10 into play and we tried it. It went about two or 11 three months and then we ran into a couple of 12 problems in terms of us getting reports back 13 where they would identify, they would refuse the 14 transaction, the player would then leave with 15 the cash and simply drive to another casino, head down the road half an hour later. We've 16 17 got them buying in down at that casino. Same -different circumstances. You don't have the 18 19 suspicious behaviour because you don't have the 20 cash dropoff now; you've just got them walking 21 in with cash, a known player, and they're buying in. So it wasn't solving that part of the issue 22 because it was allowing that, so then we brought 23 24 out this version of it.

25 So this version basically put it on paper:

1 here's the process and alerting part of it. And 2 it basically directed them to go back as -- any 3 time they could and reverse back the footage 4 while the buying is happening to try and 5 identify where the funds came from because if 6 they came from anywhere other than the player in 7 other suspicious circumstances, then they were -- that's the time that they're able to 8 stop the transaction, refuse the cash. 9 10 In your affidavit 2, you attach as exhibit Q 11 summaries of some 190 interviews of patrons dated between 2015 and 2020; correct? 12 13 That's correct, yes. Α 14 And were these patrons selected to be Q interviewed because they had known or suspected 15 associations with Mr. Jin, his vehicles or his 16 17 associates? Yes, that was absolutely part of the criteria 18 А that we were looking at. And it's -- and it 19 20 wasn't -- it wasn't restricted to Jin and his 21 group, but certainly that was part of the focus. 22 It was looking at players with suspicious 23 transactions, STR accounts, and bringing them 24 in, flagging them in to have -- and to conduct 25 an interview and then they make a determination

as to what their status should be and if it
 should be escalated or if they should maybe be
 sanctioned or banned dependent on the results of
 the interview.

5 So that was another progressive step of 6 going out. So we've gone from in 2011/12 to get told not to talk to customers to now we're 7 putting them on the system and requiring them to 8 9 come in for an interview. And if they don't 10 come in for an interview, which they're not 11 obligated to, we take their ability to come into 12 the casino and gamble anywhere in BC away from 13 them.

14So it was -- that was the pretext of it and15it centred on yes, mostly Paul Jin groups16because that's kind of our target group, and it17fanned out from there

18 Q Are service providers present at those19 interviews?

20 A They are not.

21 Q Why not?

A Because we chose not to allow them. We didn't want it to be part of the process and as you know -- we talked about this earlier -- when they went through that process 1, process 2, we

1 gave them the opportunity to interview the 2 patron, talk and have those discussions and 3 explain to them what happened; what they should be doing; what they shouldn't be doing. At the 4 5 end of the day if that didn't work, then it came to us doing the interview and then make a б 7 determination where it's going to go. And we made it very clear at the front end 8 9 that if you're not able to handle it at your 10 end, then we will handle it. But we can't allow them to then come in and sit in the interview 11 and be an influence in how the interview goes 12 13 and what is said and what is done, the actions 14 that are taken. We have to keep this 15 independent, and that's what we those to do, and we started it from the beginning and we've never 16 17 wavered from it. It still continues to this 18 date.

19 Q Predominantly you are not present at the20 interviews; is that correct?

A I am not. We've got people within the AML Unit who have a history -- a lengthy history in work in interviewing. Police officers, retired police officers. And as a result of their experience and translation, we have four people

largely that are used for almost all of our 1 2 interviews right now. A combination of those. 3 There's always two people in an interview. 4 Q And the interviews aren't recorded but the 5 summaries are sent to you for your review; is that correct? 6 7 Α Yes, they're not videotaped or recorded, and I 8 review every interview and approve it in terms 9 of recommendations because that's part of what 10 comes in the report. 11 0 Are the summaries also provided to law enforcement? 12 No. We've kept them very confidential from the 13 Α 14 very beginning, and they have remained as such 15 because there is a lot of personal information in there. We also -- there's a lot of 16 17 information that we need to be sensitive to in terms of it may put somebody in danger if it was 18 19 released, and we have some incidents like that 20 in interviews where they very clearly state that 21 they would be in danger if anyone knew that they 22 were talking to us. So for that reason, we've kept the entire 23 24 interviews in a separate drive, a shared drive, 25 for our unit only so you cannot access it, and

then select people, so like our lawyer, our CEO.
 Other than that, it's -- we're very tightly
 controlled.

If there's information that is discovered in that process that we have to address, we will address it outside that report, but not by providing a copy of that report -- of the interview, sorry.

9 Q Can you explain what you mean by that? 10 If there's information that comes up that's А 11 relevant that -- you're asking about, do we send it -- give it to law enforcement? If it would 12 have any relevance to law enforcement as 13 14 something that we think they should know, we 15 would package that by way of synopsis. We would say, during the course of an interview we came 16 17 across this information; it's of concern to us; 18 it's of value to -- probably to you to know, and 19 we would give that information to them through 20 either GPEB, JIGIT or a combination of both or 21 CFSEU. We would give a copy of the interview. Okay. Are the summaries provided to GPEB? 22 0 When we send them out? We don't do summaries of 23 А 24 the -- each interview. Is that what you're 25 referring to?

1QI'm just asking if GPEB can access the2summaries.

3 А If we do a summary it's only because it's 4 specific -- so it's not very often we have that. 5 It's only if we have specific information that б we have to extract out of this. So yes, we would give it to GPEB and share with GPEB. 7 In fact we meet weekly with them. So we would have 8 9 a conversation after an interview.

10 So post-COVID, when we're back and we're 11 doing more interviews -- and we will be doing more interviews -- if we come across something 12 13 that has any significance or relevance, it's 14 something that GPEB would be interested in, we 15 absolutely would share that information with them for followup so that we could work together 16 17 to resolve whatever the issue is.

Under normal circumstances we don't take -we don't do a synopsis of each interview as we do them and send them out to anybody. They're held in our file and we respond and take an action ourselves as to the content of the interview and the player profile that we're dealing with.

25 Q Some of the information provided to you by these

1		patrons is true and accurate and some of it is
2		not; is that fair?
3	A	I would say that is very good claim, yes.
4	Q	And the value of interviewing the patrons is not
5		only that they give you true information but
б		that they may give you implausible information
7		that you can determine to be implausible when
8		you compare it against their play; is that fair?
9	A	That's correct, yes.
10	Q	And in fact you describe in your affidavit that
11		a lot of patrons told you that the money they
12		had was coming from safes in their homes, and
13		you determined that that was an implausible
14		explanation for the volume of cash when compared
15		against their play; correct?
16	A	That's correct.
17	Q	And you said you did that by beginning to build
18		a catalogue, and I was wondering if you could
19		tell us more about the cataloguing process that
20		you described.
21	A	That specific piece for the cataloguing of the
22		information for the source of funds?
23	Q	M'mm-hmm.
24	A	That's what you're referring to? That was the
25		middle of 2016, and what we did was we we had

already gone through, as we talked about, this 1 2 list of 10, list of 36, a lot of people that fell in under sourced-cash conditions. 3 Then we identified a group of people. They were coming 4 in on a fairly reasonable basis, like, two to 5 three times a week in some cases, at least two 6 or three times a week for most of them, bringing 7 in large cash buy-ins in small bills. But they 8 9 weren't connected anywhere in our framework to 10 Paul Jin.

11 So they're outside -- they're getting their cash from somewhere, but they're outside the 12 13 Paul Jin group. So what we would do then is put 14 this one page out with the service providers 15 that required them to provide source of funds. So they have to provide the information of the 16 17 source of funds and where they got the cash Then we looked at -- after a couple of 18 from. 19 visits from them, we looked at is this 20 reasonable; is it something that would -- make 21 common sense and logic? And if it is, then we can put notations in, but in almost every 22 23 instance it wasn't.

24 And then we used that as a basis for making 25 the determination that because what they were

1 giving us was not a reasonable response and was 2 not plausible, we placed them on sourced-cash conditions and came off that list, went on to 3 4 another bigger list. And then we continually 5 started to add more people on as we wanted to 6 for the inquiry mode. So we're looking now and 7 asking the question. Based on your response, if we're not satisfied with it, sourced-cash 8 9 conditions. Done.

10 Because ultimately that's what we need to do 11 in order to -- we removed the ability of Paul Jin's group to come on site and deliver cash 12 13 because there's nobody that can buy in with cash 14 because they're all on sourced-cash conditions. 15 We've eliminated the problem by and large, and 16 we've also got police working at their end from 17 a criminal perspective. So I think at that point we were in high gear going well. 18 MS. LATIMER: Mr. Commissioner, I think --19 20 THE COMMISSIONER: We were about to address the same 21 issue, Ms. Latimer. Yes. 22 MS. LATIMER: I was just going to say I think I 23 maybe need -- I don't know, but maybe 24 30 minutes. So I'm in your hands what you'd 25 like to do.

1 THE COMMISSIONER: All right. If we were not --2 MR. McGOWAN: I will say, Mr. Commissioner, that I think for the witnesses we have tomorrow and 3 4 Friday, we have ample time. If you thought it 5 appropriate and the witness was available, we could make some time available tomorrow morning 6 7 for Ms. Latimer to conclude her examination so that at least that was out of the way. 8 THE COMMISSIONER: Yeah, I think it's been a fairly 9 10 lengthy examination thus far. If you're 11 available tomorrow, Mr. Tottenham, I think we'll adjourn until tomorrow at 9:30. Is that -- are 12 13 you available then? 14 THE WITNESS: Yes, that's fine, Mr. Commissioner. 15 THE COMMISSIONER: All right. Thank you. We will adjourn, then, until tomorrow at 16 17 9:30. THE REGISTRAR: This hearing is adjourned until 18 9:30 a.m. on November 5th, 2020. Thank you. 19 20 (WITNESS STOOD DOWN) 21 (PROCEEDINGS ADJOURNED AT 2:06 P.M. TO NOVEMBER 5, 2020) 22 23 24 25